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COMMENT 
THE MONSTER IN THE 
TELEVISION: 
THE MEDIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE CONSUMER LITIGATION 
BOOGEYMAN 
KIMBERLIANNE PODLAS· 
INTRODUCTION 
Any American who has picked up a newspaper or turned 
on a television in the last decade has heard how litigation 
against business has run amok. 1 Empirical evidence, however, 
suggests these claims lack basis.2 Nonetheless, the resulting 
• JD magna cum laude Buffalo School of Law; BA magna cum laude, SUNY 
Buffalo. After practicing criminal appellate law for 8 years, Dr. Podlas has taught law 
at the undergraduate and graduate levels for the last 5, most recently at Caldwell 
College, NJ. She would like to thank the members of the Huber Hurst Seminar, espe-
cially Dr. Susan Marsnik, for their support of this research, and Golden Gate Law 
Review board member Andrea Bastian who made this the best law review experience 
to date. 
1 THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAwsUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 2 (2002). 
2 See generally VALERIE P. HANs, BUSINESS ON TRIAL 9,56-58 (2000) !hereinaf-
ter BUSINESS); THoMAS KOENIG & MICHAEL RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAw 3-5, 6 
(2001) (contesting rhetoric of social litigiousness); Bruce A. Finzen & Brooke B. Tas-
soni, Editor's Letter: Regulation of Consumer Products: Myth, Reality, and the Media, 
11 KAN. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 523 (2002) (business claims lack empirical evidence); Mi-
chael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About The Behavior Of The Tort Litigation 
System - And Why Not? 140 U. PENN. L. REv. 1147 (1998) (claims of litigation explo-
sion overblown); Marc S. Galanter, Reading The Landscape Of Disputes: What We 
Know And Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious And 
239 
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"litigation anxiety" exerts a profound impact on the strategic 
and operational decisions of business.3 Unfortunately, litiga-
tion management, which purports to be a rationally based as-
sessment of the possibilities and likely outcomes of litigation, is 
held hostage by fear and hamstrung by ignorance of the pro-
pensities of consumer plaintiffs. 
With regard to consumers, many things influence liti-
giousness, but the most constant wide-reaching factor in fore-
casting the propensity to dispute is the influence of cultural 
norms.4 These socially defined expectations tell us whether 
and under what circumstances society deems litigation appro-
priate - in short, whether and when to sue. Thus, the key to 
understanding whether an individual will identify an action as 
a legal wrong and formally dispute that action is discerning 
that individual's social construction of litigious reality." 
In contemporary society, the media, specifically television, 
is our primary messenger of social norms.6 Television's images 
show us how to act and what is normal. In the last decade, the 
syndicated television courtroom - television shows like The 
People's Court and Judge Judy - assumed the role as cultural 
messenger with regard to the norms and ways of law. Conse-
quently, it is important to ascertain the norms that "syndi-
court" promotes, its influence, if any, on audiences, and how its 
stories may influence consumer-to-business litigation, particu-
larly, whether syndi-court discourages or encourages litigation 
and under what circumstances. 
This Article investigates and quantifies television's, spe-
cifically syndi-court's, function as a messenger of norms regard-
ing litigation and litigiousness. After acknowledging the per-
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Landscape] (discrediting 
claims oflitigation crisis). 
3 Katherine E. Giddings & J. Stephen Zielezienski, Insurance Defense in the 
Twenty·First Century: The Florida Bar's Proposed Statement of Insured Client's Rights 
- A Unique Approach to the Tripartite Relationship, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 855, 868 
(2001); see Joseph F. Speelman, The MTBE Controversy: Defending Mass Tort Claims, 
69 DEF. COUNSEL J. 35 (2002); Jeffery Rothfeder, Living with Litigation: The way 
CEOs handle brushes with litigation will probably determine how successfully they 
manage their companies, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Dec. 2001 at 20. 
, Julie MacFarlane, Why Do People Settle?, 46 MCGILL L.J. 663 (2001). 
• Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact That It Has Had is Between 
People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs'Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 
453, (2000) (environment of civil litigation includes what is an injury, whom to blame, 
and how to respond to others). 
6 See infra notes 102-19 and accompanying text. 
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vasiveness of litigation anxiety within the business world, the 
Article outlines deleterious effect of that anxiety on litigation 
management. It is suggested that restricting litigation man-
agement to traditional models of rational analysis - models 
that ignore the individual rationality of consumer plaintiffs -
fails to achieve the goal of accurately assessing litigation risk. 
This Article posits that a better understanding of the nor-
mative rationality of consumer plaintiffs, i.e., their socially in-
fluenced constructions of litigation, their motivations behind 
suit, and their beliefs regarding litigation, can remediate the 
shortcomings of the traditional model of litigation risk assess-
ment. A more sophisticated understanding of the factors af-
fecting a consumer's decision to pursue disputing also improves 
the ability to design responses to consumer disputants. 
Research on the civil litigation process, however, tends ex-
clude the transformative process by which individuals choose to 
pursue litigation. 7 Few studies report empirical evidence of a 
putative plaintiffs likelihood of doing so. Consequently, this 
Article seeks to develop an empirical base by critically analyz-
ing syndi-court's structure, normative messages, and effect on 
the public. Ultimately, the findings are extrapolated to con-
sumer-to-business disputing and litigation management 
strategies that better account for these normative understand-
ings. 
I. LITIGATION: BUSINESS'S MONSTER UNDER THE BED 
A. BUSINESS'S FEAR OF LITIGATION 
Litigation is the boogeyman that business fears.8 Almost 
everyone has heard stories of unfair lawsuits9 that ran an or-
7 See MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 668 (civil justice reform scholarship focuses 
on adjudicative system and its agents rather than claimants). 
8 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 454 (business's "extreme fear of litigation"). 
One author states that large companies typically are juggling 450 suits at any given 
time. THOMAS A. SCHWEICH, PROTECT YOURSELF FROM BUSINESS LAWSUITS: AND 
LAWYERS LIKE ME 17 (1998). 
It is claimed that in the last 30 years, "American business and their insurers 
have experienced an unprecedented increase in litigation." Giddings & Zielezienski, 
supra note 3, at 867; WALTER K OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED 
WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwsUIT (1991) (increased litigation since 1940's); 
John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' And Executives' 
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 1, 26 (1998) (94% of executives surveyed be-
3
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ganization out of business/o forced it into bankruptcy/lor 
caused its life-saving products to be removed from the shelves.12 
Invariably, the moral of these stories is that "[a]nyone can file 
a suit forcing a corporation to spend millions defending itself. "13 
In fact, many of corporate America's biggest names, such as 
Philip Morris, Ford, and Dow Corning, have "lived under the 
cloud of litigation for years."14 Increasingly, business finds it-
self plagued by litigious plaintiffs15 spurred on by gold-digging 
lieved there had been a litigation explosion); BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 56 (public 
believes litigation crisis exists; noting increases in court filings). 
, Speelman, supra note 3, at 35 (lawsuits extort massive settlements from corpo-
rations and small business "without ever resolving the validity of the claims on the 
merits"); Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 454 (frivolous and extortionist suits); Mark 
N. Vamos, The Verdict From The Corner Office, Bus. WEEK, April 3, 1992, at 66 (refer-
encing Business Weeki Harris Executive Poll, unfair lawsuits against business defen-
dants). 
10 Carlos Conde, Lawsuit Mania, HISPANIC, Dec. 1998, at 34 (survival of small 
business is easily be threatened by suit; suits force small businesses and entrepreneurs 
out of business); Finzen & Tassoni, supra note 2, at 528 (large-scale litigation efforts 
threatened livelihood of business). 
11 Conde, supra note 10 at 34 (litigation can bankrupt business); Rothfeder, su-
pra note 3, at 20-21 (litigation has forced some companies into bankruptcy); Finzen & 
Tassoni, supra note 2, at 528-29 (business claims litigation forces them into bank-
ruptcy); Paul Sweeney, Keeping Legal Costs Down, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Dec. 2001, at 46 
(after $500 million judgment, Lowen Group "began inexorable slide toward bank-
ruptcy"); PR NEWS, America's Loue Affair With Litigation Means News For Law for PR, 
June 26, 2000, at 1-2 (Dow Corning's bankruptcy due to breast implant litigation). 
12 Rothfeder, supra note 3, at 21; Finzen & Tassoni, supra note 2, at 524 (re-
counting claims that litigation explosion denies world oflife-saving products). 
"[F]ord, Firestone, and Dow Corning, have faced with an onslaught of products liability 
litigation oflate." Rothfeder, supra note 3, at 2l. 
13 Mark Sauer, Taming Trouble Torts: Some Wonder Whether Reports of Litiga-
tion Explosion Were Ouerblown, SAN DIEGO UNION TRm., April 21, 2002, at H-1 (quot-
ing Adrienne Kotner); Conde, supra note 10 (citing National Federation of Independent 
Business's estimate that the average lawsuit costs business $100,000). 
A recent Rand study, however, showed that 43% of federal lawsuits involve corpora-
tions suing each other, and only 10% involved personal injury or products liability 
claims. Robert Reno, Taking the Teeth Out of Watchdogs, NEWSDAY, July 1, 2001, at 
F08; see also Conde, supra note 10 ("lawsuits are being used as a tool against the com-
petition"). 
14 Rothfeder, supra note 3, at 2l. 
15 Mark A. Hoffman, Common Good Fights Against Litigious Culture, Bus. 
INSUR., April 29, 2002, at 40 ("culture of litigiousness" is fundamental problem in soci-
ety); BURKE, supra note 1, at 2 (recounting claims that Americans are litigious and 
greedy); Marc Galanter, The Conniuing Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal 
Remedies, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 664 (2000) [hereinafter Conniuing Claimant] 
(Americans believe there is too much litigation); Maurice' Rosenberg, Ciuil Justice and 
Ciuil Justice Reform, 15 LAw & SOC'y REV. 473 (1981) (litigation explosion); John Leo, 
The World's Most Litigious Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 1995, at 24 
(noting litigation explosion); William Mullen, US Seeks Cure For Legal Dilemma, Cm. 
TRm., July 26, 1991, at C1; Suzanne Oliver, Let The Loser Pay, FORBES, March 18, 
1991, at 96 (litigation explosion). 
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attorneyslS and pro-plaintiff juries eager to reach into the deep 
pockets of business.17 In fact, one author claims that legal 
costs now equal 5-10% of earnings for some of our nation's 
largest corporations. IS Another source estimates litigation costs 
at $100 - $300 billion annually.19 Moreover, these costs are not 
confined to business, but are passed on to consumers20 in the 
form of the infamous "tort tax,"21 i.e., increased product prices 
to account for the costs of past or future tort judgments. Al-
though many scholars suggest that this fear of litigation is ir-
rational,22 just as the monster under the bed paralyzes a child, 
so does the fear of litigation paralyze business. 
I. Finzen & Tassoni, supra note 2, at 524, 529 (greedy lawyers); Sarah D. Scalet, 
See You in Court, CIO MAGAZINE, Nov. 1,2001, at 62 (lawyers chase deep pockets and 
juries like to give deep pocket money). 
17 BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 13 (public and business perception that juries oper-
ate on deep pocket rationale). Some businesses claim they are victimized by civil juries 
who rule against them due to their perceived deep pockets rather than on the evidence. 
Id.; Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions And Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate 
Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 328-29 (1998) [hereinafter Illusions]. Others 
claim that jurors are simply anti-business. Id.; but see BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 131 
(civil juries pre-disposed toward defendants). 
18 SCHWEICH, supra note 8, at 17; KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 2, at 20 (some 
blame claim awards cause businesses to cancel insurance). The Insurance Information 
Institute estimates that the legal tab of court costs, attorney's fees, insurance premi-
ums, and payouts amount to $161 billion or 2% of the US GDP. Sweeney, supra note 
11,at47. 
19 This figure includes legal fees, jury awards, copying, and organization costs, 
but does not include costs, such as damages to corporate reputation and increased day-
to-day business costs. Michael Netzley, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Business and 
Communication Strategy, 64 Bus. COMMUNICATION QUARTERLY 83 (2001). 
2<J Sauer, supra note 13, at H-1; Timothy R. Brown, Group Puts Price Tag on 
Legal System, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (TENN.), April 17, 2002, at DSl. (litigation 
causes consumers to pay more for products). One author claims that "tort taxes" or 
the litigation-related costs passed on to consumers, increase the cost of an $80 ladder to 
$100 and a $15,000 pacemaker to $18,000. Leo, supra note 15, at 24-25. 
21 Conde, supra note 10 (referencing tort tax); This so-called "tort tax" has been 
estimated at $300 billion per year. Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 472. See also 
PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). 
22 See generally KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 2 (disputing claims of litigious-
ness and runaway juries). Some researchers dismiss the claims of American litigious-
ness as sloppy legal scholarship or propaganda. Marc S. Galanter, The Day After The 
Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Landscape, supra note 2, at 5 (debunk-
ing litigation crisis and suggesting that caseload increases merely tracked population 
growth and a defined category of product liability cases); See Saks, supra note 2, 1157 
(claims oflitigation explosion overblown); Sauer, supra note 13, at H-1 (statistics do not 
support claims of societal litigiousness); cf Tom Ramstack, Lawsuits Few So Far in 
States with Patients' Bill of Rights, Officials Say, WASH. TIMES, July 11, 2001 (several 
states report that "crippling wave oflitigation" forecast by business due to patients' bill 
of rights has not occurred). 
Indeed, a number of empirically based, rather than anecdotally based, studies 
demonstrate that litigation is either declining or remaining stable. Generally, scholars 
5
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Notwithstanding the questionable veracity of these claims 
and business's own contribution to them,23 litigation anxiety 
influences organizational decision-making. According to one 
study, 80% of corporate executives surveyed said that fear of 
suit impacted business decision-making more now than 10 
years ago.24 Another showed that 60% believed that civillitiga-
tion hampered their ability to compete globally.25 For example, 
business leaders claim that the specter of litigation forces them 
to forgo all sorts of opportunities for growth and product devel-
opment:26 pursuing novel cost saving technologies,27 and devel-
have found a low ratio of claims to lawsuits, showing that most Americans entitled to 
bring legal claims do not do so. BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 56, 58; Michael Rustad, In 
Defense Of Punitive Damages In Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes With Em· 
pirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2 and notes 1-5 therein (1992); Saks, supra note 2, at 
1183 (very plaintiffs in tort system) and Id. at 1185 (victims do not complain); see also 
Ted Rohrlich, We Aren't Seeing You In Court; Americans Aren't Suing Each Other As 
Often As They Did A Decade Ago. California, In Particular, Has Seen A Steep Decline 
In High-Stakes Personal Injury Suits, Los ANGELES TIMES [HOME EDITION], Feb. 1, 
2001, at Al (legal scholars and survey by Rand Corporation's "Institute for Civil Jus-
tice" suggest that only small percentage of injured Americans litigate claims). 
For example, a study sponsored by the Georgia Civil Justice Foundation and 
the Georgia State Bar Association found that when adjusted for population growth, tort 
lawsuits had declined from 1994-97. It thus concluded that the "litigation explosion" 
was merely "popular and political rhetoric." Bill Rankin, Litigation Data Disprove the 
Myth, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, Feb. 9, 2000, at 3C. Another study 
commissioned by the National Center for State Courts found that in 16 states, the 
number of tort suits had declined. National Council for State Courts, Litigation Di-
mensions: Tort and Contract in Large Urban Areas (1995); Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties (July 1995). Researchers saw similar 
trends with regard to malpractice claims. KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 2, at 131-33, 
143-46 (using statistics to dispute claim that medical malpractice suits are increasing); 
Abbot S. Brown, The Med·Mal Suit Explosion That Isn't, N.J. LAw., April 1, 2002, at 1 
(though malpractice insurance industry claims a litigation explosion, .number of mal-
practice suits in New Jersey declined more than 25% since 1994); Sauer, supra note 13, 
at H-1 (Judicial Council of California found 50% drop in personal-injury suits over last 
15 years). 
23 BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 70. Valerie Hans posits that the "litigation explo-
sion" rhetoric has been promulgated by business seeking to influence public conscious-
ness. Id. See also Finzen & Tassoni, supra note 2, at 524-25. Finzen concurs that 
business conducted its own public relations campaign to convince the media, the public, 
and Congress that a litigation explosion was undermining corporate America. Id. 
24 Hoffmann, supra note 15 at 40 (fear of claims "paralyzers]" business); See gen-
erally Rothfeder, supra note 3, at 20 (decisions regarding litigation are among the most 
critical for CEOs). 
25 Vamos, supra note 9. 
26 Lande, supra note 8, at 18. Many business executives believe that the poten-
tial of litigation inhibits them from engaging in the entrepreneurial activities that 
would benefit their businesses. Id. 
27 Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil 
Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 738 (1998) [hereinafter Oil Strike]. 
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oping28 or marketing new products are associated with un-
knowns, and unknowns are associated with tort verdicts.29 
B. LITIGATION MANAGEMENT 
As business's fear of lawsuits has increased, so has the im-
portance of litigation management.30 Even frivolous suits 
translate to expense.31 They can spur copycat suits,32 damage a 
business's reputation,a3 and require the involvement of coun-
seP4 (Of course, as counsel communicates with plaintiffs, files 
motions, takes depositions, and negotiates settlements hours 
28 BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 14 (unpredictability of civil juries blamed for pre-
venting innovation of U.S. businesses); see also Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass 
Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556 (1991) (manufacturers uncertain on how to limit risks will be 
discouraged from creating new products for fear that new products will result in legal 
liability); cf Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 
257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (excessive punitive damage awards chill 
creation of new products). 
29 Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 738. Galanter, however, has questioned the corre-
lation between liability costs and export performance by industry. [d. at 738-39. In 
fact, "there is absolutely no evidence that product liability hinders the competitiveness 
of American businesses." Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. Rep. No. 105-32, at 
79, 82 (1997). 
30 Giddings & Zielezienski, supra note 3, at 867. 
31 Speelman, supra note 3, at 35 (asserting that tort suits "extort major corpora-
tions and small businesses into massive settlements without ever resolving the validity 
of the claims on the merits"); Sauer, supra note 13, at H-6 ("a company can spend mil-
lions defending itself against ... frivolous suits"). 
32 Brian D. Beglin & David M. Cohen, Tiptoeing Through Mass Tort Litigation, 
RISK MGMT., April 2001, at 63 (describing how, within days, a "trickle of legal com-
plaints" can evolve into a flood of complaints); Oliver, supra note 15, at 97 (recounting 
suits by bystander defendants); [Editorial) Big Punitive Award Threatens Justice, 
SEATI'LE POST - INTELLIGENCER, February 13, 1999, at All (large damage awards 
encourage "flood of copycat suits motivated by fantasies of a big payday"). 
Even a novel suit with questionable prospects of success can encourage other suits. 
Lauren Chambliss, Courts hold key to great payout escape over Wall St, EVENING 
STANDARD (UK), August 6, 2001 (analysts cases against US market analysts not likely 
to hurt investment banks). 
33 Speelman, supra note 3, at 45 (companies cast into the role of tort defendants 
are commonly forced to defend products in the media); PR NEWS, supra note 11, at 1; 
BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 4-5 (Benlate litigation against DuPont harmed company's 
image). 
34 Indeed, lawyers have also been blamed for the litigation explosion, since more 
litigation means more business for them. See e.g., Sweeney, supra note 11, at 48 (de-
scribing "litigation machine" created by lawyers to pool resources and increase business 
litigation) and (litigation "driven by plaintiffs attorneys who seek out claims on behalf 
of consumers"); Michael Kirsch, Lawyers, Heal Thyselves, 85 A.B.A. J. 96 (May 1999), 
(lawyers contribute to "litogomania"); Leo, supra, note 15, at 24 (trial lawyers promote 
"litigation lottery"); OLSON, supra note 8 (accusing lawyers of prompting plaintiffs to 
sue and churning out "junk litigation"). 
7
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will be billed.)35 Consequently, litigation is now a comprehen-
sively managed, full-time enterprise as well as "a major ex-
pense item in annual budgets .... "36 It requires the oversight 
of millions of dollars, not to mention the companion costs of 
settlements, verdicts, and corporate reputation.37 In fact, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers reports that U.S. based companies 
spend 3-10% of their yearly revenues on managing litigation.3s 
In its conventional form, litigation risk assessment mimics 
basic cost-benefit analysis,39 assigning weights to and balancing 
factors deemed important to the parties.40 These factors typi-
cally include41 the cost of judgments, litigation costs and attor-
ney's fees, ramifications of negative publicity on consumer 
spending,42 the loss of market opportunities,43 and uncertainty 
about the business that discourages investment.44 The sum of 
35 Andrew Wood, Legal Costs Too High?, CHEMICAL WEEK, Nov. 4, 1998, at 33, 34 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates legal spending for chemical companies as 0.42% of 
yearly revenue); David M. Katz, Employment Bias: Should You Settle, or Risk a Jury 
Trial, CFO.COM, May 24, 2001, http://www.cfo.comlArticle?article=3351 last visited 
March 10, 2004. 
36 Giddings & Zielezienski, supra note 3, at 868 (litigation no longer a matter of 
only occasional concern, but "a major expense item in annual budgets, necessitating 
comprehensive management controls"); Matthew T. Miklave, Why "Jury" Is A Four 
Letter Word, 77 WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT, March 1998, at 56, 56-58. 
37 Giddings & Zielezienski, supra note 3, at 868. PricewaterhouseCoopers, how-
ever, cautioned that counsel and financial officers do not fully comprehend legal and 
risk-avoidance expenses. Sweeney, supra note 11, at 48. 
In fact, litigation management guidelines are commonly incorporated into retention 
contracts between insurers and defense attorneys. Giddings & Zielezienski, supra note 
3, at 868. Typical guidelines include who will be and must be consulted and which 
actions require prior approval. Id. at 868-69. 
38 Sweeney, supra note 11, at 47. This figure includes insurance premium pay-
ments.Id. 
39 MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 705 ("rational risk assessment is a straightfor-
ward cost-benefit analysis"). 
40 Id. at 704-05 (cost-benefit analysis in litigation weights factors that are known 
and perceived as fact) . 
• , MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 706. Risk assessment should also consider: (1) 
what damages might be awarded, (2) is it likely that the judge will side with the other 
party, (3) how long will it take to go to trial, and (4) what will the costs expended on 
this dispute be in comparison to the costs to achieve the "best outcome." 
42 PR NEWS, supra note 11, at 1 ("Your reputation is only as good as the last 
negative allegation") . 
... MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 706. Some tangible commercial consequences 
include the "loss of future contracts, and workplace morale problems .... " Id.; Richard 
Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 
HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1, 4 (1999) (valuations include how much the case is worth 
and likelihood of prevailing) . 
.. MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 706; PR NEWS, supra note 11, at 1 (litigation can 
damage stock prices). 
8
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this supposedly objective measurement45 presumably repre-
sents the best interests of the parties.46 With this calculation, 
business can decide whether to settle, litigate, pay through in-
surance, or ignore a claim. 
Of course, for risk assessment to work, the calculation 
must include all relevant factors and weight them correctly. 
Unfortunately, evidence suggests that calculations are com-
monly flawed in this regard.47 Not only are some factors ill-
weighted, but those external to business and its ideas of ra-
tional action are ignored. Whereas calculations irrationally 
assume that consumer litigants make risk-neutral outcome-
maximizing decisions,48 studies demonstrate that this is not 
true.49 Instead, consumers seldom know the legal rules under-
pinning their disputes, cannot therefore assess strength or 
likely gains, and are influenced by factors independent of the 
facts of the case50 and economic rationality.51 For instance, con-
Regarding claims that punitive damages anxiety deters investment, a statisti-
cal analysis of tort lawsuits against publicly-traded businesses found no statistically 
significant abnormal stock returns and concluded that the data did not support the 
hypothesis that settlements shaped by punitive damages constitute the main effect of 
punitive damages. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and 
Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J. L. & ECON. 527, 533-35 (1999) (studying 
suits from 1986-1996) . 
.. This measurement contemplates the likely outcome of litigation. Indeed, a 
prominent view of litigious behavior likens it to an economic model, wherein potential 
litigants base their decisions to settle, litigate, or lump it based on a desire to maximize 
the value of litigation. See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychologi-
cal Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 163, 170-71 (2000) . 
.. MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 705 ("such accounting represents the best inter-
ests of the [disputants])." 
., See Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical 
Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REv. 585, 597 
(1988). 
For further observations regarding the failures of economic analysis in contemplating 
an individual's choice to dispute, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998) . 
.. Guthrie, supra note 45, at 165; MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 668 . 
• 9 Guthrie, supra note 45, at 175-76; Jolls et aI., supra note 47, at 1471 (social 
science research on decision-making) . 
.. MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 668-69 (disputant's settlement appraisals influ-
enced by factors other than advice from attorney). 
"Id. Even when consumer perceptions of the ease, cost, and benefits of litiga-
tion are objectively faulty, their exclusion from calculation hamstrings rational as-
sessment. Cf id. at 709. In settlement negotiations, discussions should go beyond the 
factual confines of the legal case to encompass a disputant's expectations and ideas of 
fairness. Id. 
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sumers are guided by emotions,s2 experience with,s3 and percep-
tions oflaw.54 This does not mean that the behavior of putative 
plaintiffs is unpredictable or random, but that traditional mod-
els are too constricted to quantify it accurately.55 
One study showed that lawyers' assessment capabilities56 
fall short when it comes to jury awards, as they overestimate 
both the proportion of verdicts for plaintiffs and the size of 
awards.57 Business management fares even worse. Some 
managers are too distanced from the conflict and dissociated 
from its outcome58 to make an accurate assessment. Others 
have such a dark view of the litigation liability situation59 that 
they improperly overestimate risk.60 In fact, a study showed 
that administrators perceive the threat of litigation as even 
greater than did legal counsel. 61 
As a result, despite the millions of dollars annually de-
voted to litigation management,62 this enterprise suffers from 
52 Id. at 668 (studies do not consider how litigants are feeling about the conflict 
and how it affects orientation toward pursuing and construing it). 
53 Id. at 705 (definition of risk is narrow and suffers from "tendency to exclude 
the experience of the disputants themselves") . 
.. Id. at 705 (other factors besides likely legal outcome are important for liti-
gants, and "deserve fuller consideration than they commonly receive"). 
55 See Jolls et aI., supra note 47, at 1474-75 . 
.. Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 746-47. Counsel, however, may not only be inef-
fective in accurately quantifying litigation risk, but also have an interest in magnifying 
the menace of litigation. Id. at 748. 
57 Songer, supra note 47, at 597; see also Lande, supra note 8, at 15-16 (outside 
counsel compared with inside counsel and executives had most favorable view of litiga-
tion). 
These mistaken beliefs were also unusually resistant to change. Even after lawyer 
respondents were made aware of accurate statistics regarding litigation, they contin-
ued to overestimate its frequency. Id. at 600; see also Thomas Koenig, Measuring the 
Shadow of Punitive Damages: Their Effect on Behavior: The Shadow Effect of Punitive 
Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169, 174-75 (difficulty of predicting puni-
tive damages result in unnecessary trials) . 
.. MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 707 (in competitive culture of corporate govern-
ance, purely objective risk appraisal is rare). 
59 Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 742. Many claimed that the risk of product liabil-
ity litigation caused them to discontinue products or forgo introduction of new prod-
ucts. Id. These beliefs, though common, generally are not based on first-hand experi-
ence. Id. at 742-43. 
60 Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 737-38. Galanter reports that more recent studies 
show that a corporation's total liability risk equaled $0.255 for every $100 in revenue, 
whereas in 1987 it was $0.259 per $100 in revenue. Id. at 737, citing J. Robert Hunter, 
Product Liability Insurance Experience 1984·1993 (March 1995). 
61 Oil Strike, supra note 27 at 743 (reporting study by Charles Epp). Presuma-
bly, counsel is in the better position to assess potential problems. Id. at 743; see gener-
ally Oliver, supra note 15 (business will do almost anything to avoid suit). 
62 Giddings & Zielezienski, supra note 3, at 868. 
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an irrational fear of the litigation it seeks to manage63 and an 
ignorance of the propensities, motivations, desires, and under-
standings about litigation held by consumer plaintiffs. Lacking 
a valid perspective and empirically-based assessments of the 
propensities of putative plaintiffs, business tends to overesti-
mate the frequency of high-end litigation,64 the number of 
judgments, and the amounts of verdicts.65 The result is that 
business unnecessarily pays claims when it should not,66 settles 
at dollar amounts that it need not,67 and relinquishes control to 
insurance carriers who prey on fear to maintain inflated insur-
ance premiums.68 
C. A CALL TO ARMS 
It is time to turn on the lights and illuminate the propensi-
ties underlying the process by which individuals decide to liti-
gate. A more accurate understanding of when and under what 
circumstances consumers are prone to litigate and for what 
anticipated result will modernize the quantification of factors. 
63 Oliver, supra note 15. Fear impacts how legal claims are handled, and 
whether, when, and with whom to settle. Id. Indeed, "[mlost businesses will do any-
thing to avoid being sued." Id.; See also ROBERT L. KIDDER, CONNECTING LAw & 
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND THEORY 47-48 (1983) (describ-
ing strategies and decision-making in identifying with whom to settle and when to pay 
more for claims than the law requires) . 
.. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empiri-
cal Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745-46 (2002) (misperceptions about jury decision-
making, level, and frequency of damage awards are strong). 
65 Id. at 745 (incorrect perceptions about cost and likelihood of punitive dam-
ages); Id. at 763 (businesses tend to focus on jury's propensity to award punitive dam-
ages) . 
.. Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 747 (may induce corporate functionaries to overes-
timate threat and make settlement and business decisions that cannot be accounted for 
in terms of actual propensities of juries). 
67 Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Per-
spective, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849, 880 (1998) (noting studies suggesting that less serious 
injuries are overcompensated); Eisenberg et aI., supra note 64, at 768 (the ways in 
which business presumes settlement behaviors based on incorrect presumptions). 
Indeed, plaintiffs-side attorneys have said that the specter of punitive damages pro-
vid~s leverage in settlement negotiations with business. Koenig, infra note 57, at 176 
(acknowledgment that punitive damages claims provide important leverage for clients); 
William Glaberson, Ideas & Trends: The $2.9 Million Cup of Coffee; When The Verdict 
Is Just Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, at a25 (reporting study by National Center 
for State Courts that found only 0.047% of cases end in punitive damages). 
68 One advocacy organization has argued that business's irrational fear of suit 
has had the effect of increasing the number of defense wins of product liability trials, 
because business settles all but the most easily winnable cases. Koenig, supra note 57, 
at 173. 
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In this way, business can better understand litigation risk and 
its economic ramifications, and construct increasingly respon-
sive consumer-complaint systems that more rationally cost out 
settlements, refunds, and litigation. 
II. ACCULTURATION To LITIGATION 
A. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION TO LITIGATE 
A number of factors influence an individual's proclivity to-
ward suit.69 For instance, structural factors such as tort liabili-
ties70 and remedies71 can expand or contract, procedural barri-
ers can be erected or destroyed,72 and filing fees or the ease of 
obtaining counsel can wax and wane.73 Other factors are cul-
tural,74 and are arguably the most important variables in pur-
suing litigation.75 These set the stage for how a potential dis-
putant constructs a litigious moment. 76 
The cultural environment of litigation77 is made up of 
norms.78 Though there are many definitions,19 generally, norms 
69 See generally BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 5-10. 
70 Miklave, supra note 36, at 56-57 (in past decade, Congress and state legisla-
tures expanded legal protections for employees); see BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 6-7 
(significant legal developments have been strict products liability, substitution of com-
parative negligence for contributory negligence, and class actions). 
71 Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 718 (enlargement of remedy accompanied by cul-
tural shift in expanded notion of rights). 
72 Among those developments: the Supreme Court interpreted law to make sum-
mary judgment on behalf of tort defendants more readily available, see e.g., Celotex 
Corp.v. Catrett, 477 U.S: 317, 323-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 
242, 247-48 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 
(1986). State courts tightened sanctions for frivolous lawsuits and The Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amended Rule 11. Guthrie, supra note 
45, at 164. 
73 Cf Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation, A Comparative Per-
spective, 11 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 405, 405-08 (2001) (describing how class action 
permits the harms of more individuals to be grieved); [d. at 409 (noting procedural 
elements of class action litigation). 
7. MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 669 (cultural, cognitive, psychological, and affec-
tive orientations of disputants impact decision-making regarding disputes). 
75 [d. at 669 (how disputants make sense of conflict is the most important vari-
able). 7. [d. at 670-71 (culture of conflict includes values and beliefs that influence an 
individual's construction of conflict and experience with disputes); see generally JoIls et 
aI., supra note 47 at 1474 (human preferences are constructed by social situations). 
77 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 453-54 ("cultural environment surrounding 
civillitigation--e.g., what is perceived as an injury; whether and whom to blame for an 
injury; what to do about it"). 
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are social expectations of how one is to act.80 They tell us what 
others deem right or wrong,81 what behaviors are appropriate, 
and what reactions are "normal." Inasmuch as norms tell us 
what should and should not be done, 82 they influence our 
choices83 and behaviors.84 
Just as norms influence myriad attitudes and behaviors,85 
so do they influence attitudes and behaviors regarding litiga-
tion.86 Norms socialize us into society's expectations regarding 
disputes87 signaling what is an injury, what to do about it,88 and 
what society's reaction to or perceptions about disputes and 
disputants will be.89 
" Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-abiding Society: Taking Pub· 
lie Views about Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account when 
Formulating Substantive Law" 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 707, 719 (2000) (social values 
underlie social behavior); Dan Coates and Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the 
Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAw & SOC'y REV. 655, 666-67 (1981) (social comparisons 
influence "naming and blaming" stages oflegal disputing). 
" Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REv. 338, 350 (1997) ("considerable effort has gone into defining exactly what 
constitutes a norm" and "[tjhe economics literature continues to struggle over the is-
sue") (internal citations omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
COLUM. L. REv. 903, 914 (1996) (social norms understood in many different ways). 
80 Sunstein, supra note 79, at 914. 
8' JOEL CHARON, THE MEANINGS OF SOCIOLOGY 107 (4th ed. 1993) (norms signal 
society's rules or expectations). 
82 Sunstein, supra note 79, at 914. According to Sunstein, norms are "social 
attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifYing what ought to be done and what 
ought not to be done." Id. 
83 Id. at 939 . 
.. CHARON, supra note 81, at 108; McAdams, supra note 79, at 339; Sunstein, 
supra note 79, at 907 (behavior "pervasively a function of norms"); see also Tyler & 
Darley, supra note 78, at 719 (social values underlie social behavior) . 
.. MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 671 (cultural factors influencing norms of disput-
ing are broader than gender, race, or ethnicity, and should encompass values and be-
liefs) . 
.. W. BARNETT PEARCE & STEPHEN W. LITTLEJOHN, MORAL CONFLICT: WHEN 
SOCIAL WORDS COLLIDE 50 (1997). Just as culture shapes our beliefs and actions in 
response to our social world, so does it shape our understanding of conflict, its resolu-
tion, and outcomes. Id.; Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 457-58 (culture oflitigation 
deals with people's ideas about the world around them). 
87 Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 
LAw & Soc'y REv. 157 (2000); see also CHARON, supra note 81, at 167 (noting impor-
tance of socialization in following society's rules oflaw) . 
.. Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 453-54; Sunstein, supra note 79, at 914 
(norms define what actions to be taken). 
so Rohrlich, supra note 22, at Al (litigation-oriented decisions are made with 
reference to social norms of suit and plaintiffs); see MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 674 
(discussing construction of meaning in dispute analysis and processing). 
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For example, before one files a suit or complains formally, 
she must identify what she believes to be a litigable claim.90 
This does not mean that the individual knows the legal rules91 
or that, if she does, she will follow them, but that she perceives 
that what has befallen her constitutes a legal wrong. This 
judgment can be based on actual knowledge of the law, aware-
ness of urban myths,92 or how she has seen others act under 
similar circumstances. 
Once a litigious moment is identified, the aggrieved must 
decide whether to pursue it and to what remedy.93 Again, this 
assessment is made with reference to norms. We compare our 
own situation with those of others, and we consider what they 
have done and whether society has responded negatively or 
positively to those choices.94 Norms also signal when litigation 
is inappropriate.95 When the public image of litigation implies 
that it is disagreeable,96 demeaning,97 or embarrassing,98 and its 
90 MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 679-80. For a grievance to mature into a legal 
dispute, the victim must perceive a wrong as qualifying for redress. Id. Not all ag-
grieved, however, engage in this "naming," and, therefore, do not recognize a legally 
cognizable injury. Id. See also Saks, supra note 2, at 1188-89. The many victims who 
do not realize that they have viable legal claims, never bother to sue. Id. Of course, 
one may appropriately identify a valid legal claim, may think that they have a cause of 
action, but be incorrect, or identify a colorable, but very weak claim, and overestimate 
its value 
91 A common but unsupported assumption in [rational assessment] is that indi-
vidual actors know the law. Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring 
Influences on Workers'Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447,448 (1999). 
92 See Conniving Claimant, supra note 15 (recounting popular legal legends). 
93 MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 682 (transformation of grievance upon voicing it 
and requesting remedy), 
.. Rohrlich, supra note 22, at AI. If she has seen litigants of similar claims 
treated positively, she may consult an attorney or file a claim in small claims or state 
civil court. If she has heard about their type of complaint being mediated, she might 
complain to a 'company's customer service department, draft a letter, or turn to the 
local Better Business Bureau for intervention. 
95 This will discourage suit. Consequently, norms not only discourage or encour-
age litigious behaviors, but also become the gatekeepers of litigation: they dissuade 
people from litigation, when the collective consciousness deems lawsuits wrong, and 
invite potential litigants, when it deems litigation acceptable. 
96 Julie Paquin, Avengers, Avoiders, and Lumpers: The Incidence of Disputing 
Style On Litigiousness, 19 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 17 (2001); "Many people 
think oflitigation as a disagreeable experience" Id.; Lande, supra note 8, at 3 (media's 
image of litigation is largely negative). 
97 Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 
PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'y & L. 645, 649-50, 655-56 (1997) (shame influences creation and 
enforcement of norms) . 
.. Saks, supra note 2, at 1189 (potential plaintiffs avoid suit because of stigma 
associated with litigation). 
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plaintiffs "blameworthy"99 or greedy,lOO it imputes norms disfa-
voring litigation. For example, though the public now may be 
legally conscious that McDonald's could be liable should one 
spill coffee on oneself and be burned, society's reaction to 
Stella's coffee spill and tort recoverylOI was so negative that an 
injured spiller might forgo litigation. 
Thus, it is critical to understand what the social norms of 
litigation are, how they are shaped by our environment, and 
the force they exert in contemporary society. With this knowl-
edge, business can better understand when people will dispute 
as well as their motivation for doing so. The former is impor-
tant in forecasting litigation and amortizing costs; the latter is 
important for intelligently managing litigation risks and devel-
oping the most cost-effective methods for responding to con-
sumer claims. 
B. NORMS ON TELEVISION 
Though a universally-accepted theory of how norms origi-
nate has yet to emerge,t°2 two conditions are clearly necessary 
for their formation: lo3 (1) an apparent consensus of belief or be-
havior and (2) publicityl04 of that consensus to the public. lOS In 
other words, popularity of action or belief is not enough. 
Rather, individuals must be aware that such a consensusl06 ex-
ists so that they have a standard against which to judge their 
own behavior.107 The media plays a critical role in ensuring that 
99 Illusions, supra note 17, at 334-35 (research demonstrates that victims are 
often blamed for fate). 
100 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 454 (public believes plaintiffs bring unjusti-
fied lawsuits); Conniving Claimant, supra note 15, at 664 (litigants portrayed as "petty, 
oversensitive, obsessive, exploitative, and sociopathic"). 
101 See BURKE, supra note 1, at 2.This refers to Stella Liebeck's tort suit against 
McDonald's for coffee burns and related medical expenses. 
102 McAdams, supra note 79, at 391. Indeed, much literature discusses how law 
might change norms, but ignores theories of their origin. Id. at 352; Massaro, supra 
note 97, at 674 (sociologists disagree about which cultural variables exert most influ-
ence on norms). 
103 McAdams, supra note 79, at 39l. 
104 Id. at 400. This publicity condition is difficult to satisfy and is "[t)he determi-
native obstacle to societal norm formation." Id. at 400-0l. 
105 Id. at 360 (esteem-based norms require publicized consensus). 
106 Id. at 362 (ignorance of consensus cannot produce norm). 
107 CHARON, supra note 81, at 98; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Mean-
ing, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997) (individuals draw inferences from 
the popularity of behavior of others). 
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both of these prerequisites are met. It shows us, accurately or 
not, what the consensus behavior is, and publicizes it to us 
with word, sound, and image. The media also does so with re-
gard to norms of disputing,108 presenting stories about litigation 
that define normality. 
For instance, at the turn of the century, litigation was un-
common,109 and this was paralleled by media coverage that ei-
ther did not report litigation or described it as inappropriate.lIo 
When industrial accidents skyrocketed, 111 coverage changed. 
Newspapers began publicizing these accidents , 112 and spoke of 
suits filed by injured innocents against big business.113 The 
tone and content of these stories indicated that litigation of this 
type was just, and helped support social norms favoring litiga-
tion.114 Soon, a society that had eschewed litigation, began to 
sue in greater numbers.1I5 
lOB Cf Edward Sankowski, Film, Crime, and States Legitimacy: Political Educa-
tion or Mis-Education?, 36 J. OF AESTHETIC EDU. 1 (2002) (film and related media are 
important sources of visually centered narratives in contemporary culture); Mira Soti-
rovic, Effects Of Media Use On Complexity And Extremity Of Attitudes Toward The 
Death Penalty And Prisoners' Rehabilitation, 3 MEDIAPSYCHOLOGY 1, 4 (2001) ("What 
we learn about social issues generally comes to us through some type of media, broad-
cast or print"); see Carol P. Getty, Corrections - Media Wise? 63 CORRECTIONS TODAY 
126,127-28 (2001) (media both shapes and transmits norms). 
109 BURKE, supra note 1, at 2-3 (culture kept Americans out of court). 
Litigation was inconsistent with the belief systems of fatalistic Americans who ac-
cepted injuries and adversity. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 
!hereinafter HISTORY] 185-87 (2d ed. 1985); cf Paquin, supra note 96, at 30 (people who 
hold fatalistic beliefs may lack motivation to sue); Illusions, supra note 17, at 331 (so-
cietal desires to stimulate economy led to generous treatment of business corporations). 
no HISTORY, supra note 109, at 4-8. 
III Id. at 468-70. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAw IN AMERICA 43 (2002). 
("Nothing does a better job of mangling human bodies than machines"). 
n2 Id. at 545 (newspapers sensationalized high profile trials and accidents). 
n3 McAdams, supra note 79, at 391-92; BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 7. Most of that 
coverage focused on citizens suing business. See Id. See also Miklave, supra note 36, at 
57 (publicity of trials and monetary awards encourages individuals to sue); BUSINESS, 
supra note 2, at 8. It also covered protests against unsafe working conditions. Id. 
n. McAdams, supra note 79, at 391-92; BUSINESS, supra note 2, at 7-8; see also 
Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire Of 1911: Social Change, In-
dustrial Accidents, And The Evolution Of Common Sense Causality, 20 LAw & SOC. 
INQUIRY 621, 637-38 (1995) (describing how the publicity related to the fire influenced 
public opinion regarding business responsibility for accidents). 
no See generally Illusions, supra note 17, at 332 (cultural values began to change); 
Marc S. Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 
1154 (1996) (media culture stories about out of control jurors and the litigation explo-
sion have influenced public opinions but are incorrect). 
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More recently, the media has publicized beliefs that we are 
in the midst of a litigation explosion.u6 We have seen a torrent 
of stories about greedy plaintiffs and businesses victimized be-
cause of their deep pockets. ll7 News publications and broad-
casts overrepresent sensational tort stories (distorting the re-
alities of litigation), U8 and refer to punitive damages in 21% of 
those reports, though they occur in only 4.6% of cases.ll9 
C. CULTIVATION 
Although the media includes newspapers, film, and radio, 
its primary mode of normative transmission is television. The 
public receives much of its information about the world from 
television.120 Its images121 inform the way people view and act 
116 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 461-63 (business and insurance industry 
sponsored public relations campaigns asserting there was a litigation explosion). 
A law professor at New York University found that, while the average verdict in the 
New York area was $1.1 million, the average verdict as reported by The New York 
Times was $20.5 million. Glaberson, supra note 67, at a25 (reporting findings of NYU 
study); cf Vidmar, supra note 67, at 875-76 (media's skewed coverage of plaintiff wins 
and large damage awards influences public). 
117 BURKE, supra note 1, at 3. Business conjured the litigation crisis for its own 
ends. 
118 Lande, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
Television and news papers also overrepresent incidents of violence. Sarah Eschholz, 
The Media And Fear Of Crime: A Survey Of The Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL 'y 
37, 37-38 (1997). Viewers share this exaggeration, and tend to overestimate the 
amount of violence in society. Id. at 39-51 (describing literature review of25 studies on 
television viewing and anxiety about crime). 
119 Oil Strike, supra note 27 at 476 (reporting study of newspaper coverage from 
1985-96). 
Indeed, the media paid a great deal of attention to the "Contract With America" tort 
reform component. Lisa L. Posey, The Impact Of Fee-Shifting Tort Reform on Out-of-
Court Settlements, 23 J. INSURANCE ISSUES 124, 125 (2000); Miklave, supra note 36, at 
56 (litigation explosion). 
120 George Gerbner et aI., Growing Up With Television: Cultivation Processes, in 
MEDIA EFFECTS, ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 43 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf 
Zillmann, ed., 2" ed., 2002) (television is the source of the most broadly shared images 
and messages in history); Angelique M. Paul, Note: Turning The Camera On Court TV: 
Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything About The Real Law?, 58 OHIO CT. L.J. 655, 
656 (1997) (Americans get the majority of their information from television); Brian 
Lowry, In The King Trial We Wake, News Media Will Be The Message, DAILY VARIETY, 
April 7, 1993, at 1 (Roper study found that "69% of Americans ... view television as 
their primary source of news an information). 
121 Moreover, the influence of these images is enhanced by television's auditory 
and visual stimuli. Gary R. Edgerton & Michael T. Marsden, The Teacher-Scholar in 
Film and Televisions, Introduction: Media Literacy and Education, J. POPULAR FILM & 
TELEVISION 2, 3 (2002) (in past century, priorities shifted away from the printed word 
and toward the image). Print media describes, but it cannot add moving pictures, 
speech, tone, lighting, camera angles, music, and interspersion of shots. Television's 
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upon the world. l22 Moreover, because virtually every American 
owns a televisionl23 and watches it regularly,124 a huge audi-
encel25 is privy to the behaviors and opinions of othersl26 - at 
least as they are represented on the television screen. This 
makes television a profound normative messenger. l27 
A key factor explaining the force of television is the role of 
story-telling in human society.l28 A great degree of what we 
know, or believe to know, comes not from direct experience, but 
from forms of storytelling. We know about emergency room 
operating procedures, crime scene investigations, and mafia 
relations despite never having personally experienced them. In 
contemporary society, it is television that tells us those stories. 
Moreover, as television transforms story-telling into a central-
ized system, television also becomes the primary common 
source of cultural information: l29 Its images tell us how things 
work and what to do. l30 
news includes pictures with its narrative, but its narratives are a metered vocal tone, 
accompanied by stolid sets and largely static images. It is the difference between read-
ing a screenplay and seeing the completed, scored movie. Sankowski, supra note 108, 
at 1 (film and related media are important sources of visually centered media); 
122 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 457-58 (describing law as popular culture 
that informs views of world and decision-making in response to law). 
123 98% of Americans have at least 1 television. Todd Picus, Demystifying the 
Least Understood Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to Broadcast Media, 71 TEx. L. 
REV. 1053, 1085 n.172. 
124 Since 1983, the average household has tuned in 7 hours per day. TODD GITUN, 
MEDIA UNLIMITED 15-16 (2003); Edgerton & Marsden, supra, note 121, at 3. The aver-
age adult watches over 4 hours of television each day, GITLIN at 16, and his or her 
children will watch even more. Id.; L.J. Shrum, Effects of Television Portrayals of 
Crime and Violence on Viewers' Perceptions of Reality: A Psychological Process Perspec-
tive, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 257 (1998) (more than 4 hours per day for individuals; 7 hours 
per day for households). Adults over 55 years of age watch the most television, ap-
proximately 5 I;2 hours daily. Edgerton & Marsden, supra note 121, at 4. 
125 Paul, supra note 120, at 656 (Americans get majority of information from tele-
vision); Lowry, supra note 120, at 1. 
126 Kahan, supra note 107, at 351 (we draw inferences from the behavior of oth-
ers). 
127 Scott L. Althaus & David Tewksbury, Agenda Setting and the "New" News, 
Patterns of Issue Importance Among Readers of the Paper and On·line Versions of the 
New York Times, 29 COMM. RES. 180, 181 (2002) (television is dominant mechanism for 
disseminating information). 
128 Gerbner et aI., supra note 120, at 44. A basic difference between humans and 
other animals is that humans live in a world that is created by the stories we tell. Id. 
129 Id. at 44; see generally Jonathan Cohen & Gabriel Weimann, Cultivation Re-
visited: Some Genres Have Some Effects On Some Viewers, 13 COMM. REp. 99, 101-02, 
107-08 (2000). 
130 JAMES SHANAHAN & MICHAEL MORGAN, TELEVISION AND ITS VIEWERS, 
CULTIVATION THEORY AND RESEARCH ix-x (Gerbner introduction) (1999). 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/2
2004] THE MONSTER IN THE TELEVISION 257 
Cultivation theory131 investigates this relationship between 
television exposure132 and particular beliefs about the world,133 
specifically, beliefs consistent with television imagery.134 Al-
though researchers have long asserted that television influ-
ences perceptions ,135 cultivation distinguishes itself from the 
theoretical models and theories of marketing or persuasion re-
search.136 Theoretical models tend to conceptualize "effect" as a 
short-term individual change. Cultivation, however, adopts a 
total immersion paradigm, looking at the long-term impacts of 
the stable, repetitive images of the medium on perceptions of 
social reality.137 Therefore, according to cultivation theory, the 
more an audience sees a behavior on television, the more it be-
lieves those behaviors are normal or socially correct.13S Con-
versely, the less an audience sees a behavior, or the more it 
sees a behavior criticized, the more the audience will believe 
that the behavior is abnormal or socially disfavored.139 
Essentially, television establishes a symbolic environment 
into which we are all born and with which we all interact.14o 
131 Edgerton & Marsden, supra note 121, at 4. 
Although cultivation began as a more limited concept, its emphasis shifted "from indi-
vidual short-term effects to the long-term cultural-ideological socialization role of re-
petitive messages found in television programming." John L. Sherry, Media Satura-
tion and Entertainment-Education, 12 COMM. THEORY 206, 211 (2002). 
132 Cohen & Weimann, supra note 129, 212 (cultivation accounts for effects of the 
dominant messages on television). 
133 SHANAHAN & MORGAN, supra note 130, at 72. 
Cultivation analysis is the theoretical approach and research strategy that grew out of 
The Cultural Indicators project. This project, which began in 1967, studies television 
policies, programs, and impacts. Gerbner et ai., supra note 120, at 43,45-47. 
13< Thomas C. O'Guinn & C.J. Shrun, The Role Of Television In The Construction 
Of Consumer Reality, 23 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 280 (1996). Cultivation analysis 
quantifies and tracks the most recurrent images in television content (i.e., message 
system analysis), and investigates whether and how television contributes to viewers's 
conceptions of social reality. See generally Gerbner et ai., supra note 120. 
1M Sotirovic, supra note 108, at 750. 
136 Gerbner et ai., supra note 120, at 47. 
137Id. at 43-44 (medium's contribution to perceptions of social reality) and at 47 
(total immersion outlook). 
138 Cohen & Weimann, supra note 129, at 99. 
139 Id. at 99; SHANAHAN & MORGAN, supra note 130, at 72 (watching a significant 
amount of television will lead viewers to hold beliefs consistent with the stories de-
picted by this medium). 
14. Gerbner et ai., supra note 120, at 48-49 (people are born into symbolic envi-
ronment with television as its mainstream). 
Importantly, cultivation is not a unidirectional process, but a gravitational one. Tele-
vision creates one stream of information, but that stream of information will influence 
viewers in different ways. Id. at 48-49. 
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Individuals learn from what they see on television.141 Even if 
they forget its specific elements, they retain general impres-
sions. These impressions influence their assessments of the 
world142 and, regardless of their accuracy, impact their deci-
sions.143 The world as seen on television, however, may bear 
little resemblance to reality.144 In fact, it may cultivate a dis-
torted view of the world.145 
For instance, cultivation initially focused on television vio-
lence, i.e., on the proposition that heavy television viewing was 
associated with exaggerated beliefs of the amount of violence in 
society. 146 Others have shown that, despite declining crime 
rates in the United States, Americans continue to believe that 
crime is rampant. 147 Again, this can be partially explained by 
linking television imagery - which overrepresents crime - with 
television viewing. Thus, the more a person watches depictions 
of crime on television, the more likely she is to believe that 
crime could touch her.148 A more recent study measured the 
cultivation effect of daytime television talk shows. Those in-
ternational students who watched more daytime television talk 
shows than non-viewing international students exhibited a cul-
tivation effect, under which their beliefs of the reality of Ameri-
can culture mirrored what they had seen broadcast.149 
l41 Paul, supra note 120, at 656 (Americans get majority of information from tele-
vision). 
142Id. This hearkens to cultivation's "mainstreaming" process, where viewers 
learn facts about the world and are socialized by observing them on the television 
screen. Cohen & Weimann, supra note 129, at 102. 
143 Sotirovic, supra note 108 (these perceptions of reality "are consequential for 
individuals' judgments and decisions"). 
In fact, significant exposure to television can lead to perceptions of reality that differ 
from those held by nonviewers. Cohen & Weimann, supra note 129, at 108. 
George Gerbner asserts that television does not merely reflect beliefs, but that cumula-
tive exposure to it generates a unique set of beliefs in viewers. George Gerbner et al., 
supra note 120 at 23-25. 
144 L.J. Shrum, supra note 124, at 26l. 
145 See generally, Gerbner et al., supra note 120, at 23-25. 
146 Id. This was due to the belief that television's programs represented the world 
a violent place; see also Id. at 52-53 (outlining "mean world" syndrome). 
147 Eschholz, supra note 118, at 37-38 (outlining "violence in society" syndrome). 
148 Id. at 38-39 (television greatly exaggerates the incidence of crime in society). 
149 Hyung-Jin Woo and Joseph R. Dominick, Daytime Television Talk Shows and 
the Cultivation Effect Among U.S. and International Students, 45 J. BROAD. & ELEC. 
MEDIA 598, 610 (2001). 
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D. LAw ON TELEVISION 
1. Television as a Window Into the Courtroom 
Television also transmits an enormous amount of informa-
tion about law.150 Indeed, television has become not only soci-
ety's most accessible window151 into the courtroom,152 but also 
its most powerful institutionalized messenger of law.153 It 
teaches individuals about litigation154 and how to behave when 
wronged. 155 Moreover, since most Americans do not have a 
great deal of personal experience to displace what they see on 
television,156 its impact is enhanced. 
ISO Getty, supra note at 120 (television, and to lesser extent, newspapers and 
movies, influence how Americans view justice); Joseph & Gayle Mertez, Law and Pop 
Culture: Teaching and Learning About Law Using Images From Popular Culture, 64 
SOC. Eouc. 206 (2000) (for many, "primary source of knowledge about ... the legal 
system" comes through television and movies); Kelly L. Cripe, Empowering the Audi-
ence: Television's Role in the Diminishing Respect for the American Judicial System, 6 
U.C.L.A ENT. L. REv. 235, 245-46 (1999) (televising criminal trials provides audience 
with great deal of information); Leah Ward Sears, Those Low-Brow TV Court Shows, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR July 10, 2001, at 11 (Americans get lasting impression of the 
courts from television). 
151 Some do not perceive television as a neutral window into the courtroom, but as 
a lens that shapes and sometimes distorts its subjects. Edwin Yoder, Television in 
Courtroom Reshapes the Reality It Covers, ST. LoUIS POST - DISPATCH, Sep. 30, 1994, 
at 13D. 
152 See e.g., Kimberlianne Podias, Please Adjust Your Signal: How Television's 
Syndi-Courtrooms Bias Our Juror Citizenry, 39 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2001); Austin Sarat, 
Exploring The Hidden Domains of Civil Justice: "Naming, Blaming, and Claiming" In 
Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 425, 450 (2000) (law lives in the media images 
that saturate our culture); David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV; Con-
ventional Television, And Public Understanding Of The Criminal Justice System, 35 
ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 786, 798 (1993). 
153 Stephan Landsman, Symposium: Civil Litigation and Popular Culture Sixth 
Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy Article: Introduction, 50 
DEPAUL L. REv. 421 (2000); Mertez, supra note 150, at 206 (pop culture is "constantly 
sending messages about how the world 'is' ... and may help shape the public's view of 
law"). 
154 Cripe, supra note 150, at 240 (television provides public with insight into trial 
system). 
A recent American Bar Association report found concluded that the media 
impacts people's knowledge about the law and justice system. American Bar Associa-
tion Report on Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1315 
(1999), reprinted report, "Perceptions of the US Justice System." 
ISS Of course, those television representations may be distorted. Birke & Fox, 
supra note 43, at 9. 
156 Elliot E. Slotnik, Television News And The Supreme Court: A Case Study, 77 
JUDICATURE 21, 22 (1993) (television provides majority of public with its only informa-
tion about law); see also Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Games: Public Perceptions of 
the Judiciary, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 909, 913 (1996) ("few individuals have direct ex-
perience with the justice system"); Mertez, supra note 150, at 206 (primary knowledge 
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2. The Impact of Syndi-Court 
Though television has long hosted some fictional legal 
fare/57 it is now an environment rich in reality law. ISS In the 
last decade, the syndicated television courtroom has metasta-
sized into the public consciousness as the "hottest trend in day-
time television."159 Television courtrooms like those of Judge 
Judy and Judge Mathis currently reach more Americans than 
any other type of legal information.160 Moreover, the syndi-
court genre hosts up to 8.5 million viewers daily.161 In light of 
this popularity, syndi-court's potential for influence is enor-
mous.162 
about law comes from pop culture sources, including television; television shapes pub-
lic's perception oflaw) (this material has become too pervasive to ignore); Cripe, supra 
note 150, at 240 (public relies on media's portrayal of justice system). 
157 Popular legal television shows include "Perry Mason," "L.A. Law," "The Prac-
tice," and "Ally McBeal." See Diane Klein, Ally McBeal and Her Sisters: A Quantitative 
and Qualitative Analysis of Representation of Women Lawyers on Prime-Time Televi· 
sion, 18 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 259 (1998). Everywhere one looks, stories are being 
told about civil litigation. Landsman, supra note 153, at 421; Neal R. Feigenson, Legal 
Meaning in the Age of Images: Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 
742 (1999/ 2000) (televised legal events, both fictional and real, show pop culture vi-
sions of the justice system). 
ISS Lisa Scottoline, Law and Popular Culture: Get Off The Screen, in 24 NOVA L. 
REV. 655, 656 (2000) (television shows like Judge Judy represent new breed of televised 
law). 
159 Mark Jurkowitz, Hour of Judgment, BOSTON GLOBE, December 3, 2000, at 9; 
EBONY, [Judicial] Here Come The Judges, May 2002, at 96 ("[s]yndicated courtroom 
shows are increasing in popularity"). 
160 Marc Gunther, The Little Judge Who Kicked Oprah's Butt; Daytime Televi-
sion's Hottest Property, FORTUNE, May 1999, at 32 (in 1997, "Judge Judy" was the 
number-one ranked syndicated program); Joe Schlosser, Another Benchmark for 'Judge 
Judy,' BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 29, 1999, at 15. 
'" Schlosser, supra note 160, at 15. The week of January 21-27, 2002, "Judge 
Judy" had 8.4 million viewers, and "Judge Joe Brown" 4.4 million. ENT. WKLY., Feb. 22, 
2002, at 133; see also Bill Keveny, Syndicated Goldies Are Oldies: New Shows Are No 
Match, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2001, at 4D ("Judge Judy" garners 7,061,000 viewers). 
Its closest competitor, Court TV, once had 6% of that audience. Harris, supra note 152, 
at 803. Court TV reached its largest audience ever, 557,000 viewers, by changing its 
programming to include a non-courtroom show, "Forensic Files" and syndicated dra-
mas. Ed., Court TV Has Highest Quarterly Rating in Network's History, Bus. WIR', 
April 2, 2002, at 1. 
162 Although some in the legal system discount the effect of these shows on public 
opinion, others insist that these shows can alter viewers's perception of the courts. See 
Mike Saewitz, Many Judge US Justice System By The TV Courtroom Shows, Virginian 
- Pilot, Oct. 3, 2001, at E1. In fact, speaking at a symposium at Albany Law School, 
New York State's Chief Judge asserted that what the public sees on television, such as 
Judge Judy," "play[s] a huge role in public perceptions of the justice system." Judith S. 
Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 Albany L. Rev. 1491, 1493 (1999). 
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Syndi-court boasts other characteristics enhancing its abil-
ity to influence audiences. First, it is produced to be swift and 
interesting with simple,163 accessible conflicts.164 By contrast, as 
one television critic observed, programming such as Court TV 
"stands out because of its tediousness."165 As syndi-court is 
more interesting to viewers, it becomes more memorable.166 
Second, its editingl67- the camera constantly moves between 
the litigant narratives and the judge's reactionl68- also in-
creases viewer attention and thus memory.169 Third, unlike 
periodic reporting of trial or appellate decisions,170 syndi-courts 
are stable and homogenous. The images and lessons of one 
syndi-court are the lessons and images of all. This unified body 
of information heightens the ability of the audience to identify 
consistent messages within the genre and to apply them to 
163 Epstein, supra note 157, at (syndi-court is rarely dull or hard to understand). 
164 Scottoline, supra, note 158, at 657. 
165 Harris, supra note 152, at 803. 
166 Itzhak Yanovitzky, Effects of News Coverage on Policy Attention and Actions, 
29 Comm. Res. at 424 ("media effects are contingent on a person's motivation to attend 
to the message ... [mlotivation, in turn, is a function of ... message attributes"). 
167 Studies have demonstrated that increasing the number of edits in a television 
"message" increases viewers's attention as well as their ability to remember the mes-
sage. Annie Lang, et aI., The Effects of Edit on Arousal, Attention, and Memory For 
Television Images: When an Edit is an Edit Can an Edit Be Too Much? 44 J. Broad. & 
Elec. Media 94, 105 (2000). 
168 Reaction shots, such as those common of the syndi-court bench, are among the 
"most commonly used editing devices used to capture and manipulate" viewer percep-
tions. Stacy Davis, The Effects of Audience Reaction Shots on Attitudes Towards Con-
troversial Issues, 43 J. Broad. & Elec. Media 476, 477 (1999); see also Podlas, supra 
note 152, at 18-20 (empirical analysis demonstrating that jurors interpret judge reac-
tions and use them to guide evidentiary determinations). 
I6!I These elicit an "orienting response" that directs the viewer's attention to par-
ticular information presented. Lang et aI., supra note 167, at 96. 
The availability heuristic further enhances the influence of these comparisons. People 
infer the prevalence of something from the ease with which they can conjure an exam-
ple of it. Shrum, supra note 124, at 262. Of course, the more popular something seems 
to be, the easier it is to remember. Id. at 262. Thus, with syndi-court's Nielsen popu-
larity and imagery, frequent litigation and numerous pro se litigants are easy to recall. 
Unfortunately, research indicates that people are often unaware of the source of their 
information and unable or unwilling to determine the source of their memories. Id. at 
264. Therefore, it is unlikely that people will first reflect and then discount informa-
tion, because it was gleaned from syndi-court. D. Lawrence Kincaid, Drama, Emotion, 
and Cultural Convergence, 2 Comm. Theory 136 (2002) (elements increase the "active 
participation and involvement of the audience"). 
170 Christo Lassiter, TV or Not TV - That Is The Question, 86 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 928, 934-35 (1996) (trial broadcasts temporarily excite interest, but tend 
to fixate on sensational aspects). Id. at 973. 
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real-life situations. These enhance syndi-court's potential for 
cultivating social norms.l71 
Therefore, the messages of syndi-court and their effect on 
litigants deserve careful scrutiny.172 It is important to under-
stand what signals syndi-court sends, what it tells us about 
litigation, and what potential influence on attitudes and behav-
iors it may exert. Unfortunately, there has been little empiri-
cal analysis by the legal community regarding the effects of 
such television programs on the public.173 
This question does not have an a priori theoretical answer. 
In light of the litigation explosion rhetoric of the last decade, 
viewers might take syndi-court as proof positive that litigation 
is out of control. Its many plaintiffs might be construed as un-
worthy, greedy people contributing to cultural litigiousness 
plaguing our nation. This would suggest norms discouraging 
litigation and stigmatizing those who litigate. As viewers com-
pare themselves with these portraitures, they might seek to 
distinguish themselves from the type of people who go to 
court.174 Consequently, they would shy away from litigation in 
order to avoid this stigma,175 instead becoming prone to avoid 
litigation and "lump it."176 
This, however, is not the only possibility of syndi-court in-
fluence. Syndi-court might stoke the fires of litigiousness, en-
couraging litigation and public attitudes accepting it as normal. 
Though the public may not necessarily look at litigation as 
honorable, having heard about its commonality,177 and now see-
171 Shanahan & Morgan, supra note 130, at 2-3, 5. 
Considering the influence and messages of syndi-court independent of those of televi-
sion or even court shows generally is quite valid. Gunter has suggested that the culti-
vation effect is not medium-general, but genre-specific. Barie Gunter, The Question of 
Media Violence, in Media Effects, supra note 120; Cohen & Weimann, supra note 129, 
at 101-02, and 102, 108 (cultivation process varies across genres). 
17'2 Landsman, supra note 153, at 421 (television and movie narratives about 
litigation deserve special scrutiny due to their profound ability to influence litigants). 
173 Ralph E. Roberts, Jr., An Empirical And Normative Analysis of the Impact of 
Televised Courtroom Proceedings, 51 SMU L. Rev. 621 (1998) (little if any research has 
quantified the impact of televised court proceedings on the public). 
174 Sauer, supra note 13, at H-1 (injured people with valid claims avoid court so 
that they are not perceived as "the kind who goes to court"). 
'" Saks, supra note 2, at 1189 (stigma deters suit); Kidder, supra note 63, at 4. 
Some believe that business has promoted litigation as shameful. Rohrlich, supra note 
22 at Al. ("[c)orporations have created a stigma for people [who sue)"). 
176 People are inclined to give up rather than fight. Rohrlich, supra note 22, at 
Al. 
177 See supra notes 8-29 and accompanying text. 
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ing thousands of syndi-court litigants yearly, the public may 
come away with the impression that, good or evil, litigation is 
nevertheless appropriate. Moreover, to the extent that syndi-
court presents litigants who are of questionable intelligence or 
emotional maturity, viewers may think, "if they can do this, 
anyone can." Thus, syndi-court might communicate and con-
struct norms encouraging litigation and litigiousness. 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF SYNDI-COURT 
Two studies were undertaken to ascertain the normative 
influence of syndi-court in promoting or discouraging norms of 
litigiousness. This empirical investigation had two main com-
ponents. The first, a content analysis, identified and cata-
logued syndi-court content. This sought to identify trends and 
predominant messages in the genre. l7S The second translated 
this content to syndi-court inspired views and then surveyed 
individuals to determine whether viewers were more, less, or 
equally prone toward these views of litigation. 
A. CONTENT ANALYSIS 
The four highest rated syndi-courtsl79 were systematically 
monitored for one hour each, every day for two weeks (totaling 
twenty hours per show).lso Coders individually viewed and 
coded the content of shows.lsl One group of Coders, Law Cod-
ers, consisted of six individuals practicing law; the other group 
of Coders, Student Coders, consisted of eighteen students in a 
Contemporary Issues course. Each show was coded by one 
Law Coder and one Student Coder, and catalogued according to 
178 See Gerbner et al., supra note 120, at 49-50 (explaining use of message system 
analysis to identify recurrent, stable patterns of television content). 
17. Shows were chosen based on Nielsen ratings. Nielsen Media Research esti-
mates that as many as 31 million people daily see at least 1 TV judge. Jurkowitz, 
supra note 159. 
180 This yielded a total of 333 segments. 
181 This is consistent with the "message system analysis" of cultivation analysis. 
See infra notes 120-49 and accompanying text. 
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number of plaintiffs per show, 182 remedy sought, and type of 
case. 183 
The results of this coding showed that syndi-courts hosted 
an average of 19.7 plaintiffs per syndic-court per week. Thus, a 
daily viewer of only one syndi-court would see over 1,000 plain-
tiffs per year. Additionally, though the majority of cases fell 
into the property damage category, when separated by show, 
the most common type of claim was a contract claim. Fur-
thermore, the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs sought 
monetary remedies in the $100-$499 range. Some even ex-
plained that their primary motivation for litigating was to ex-
act an apology or because the defendant had never apologized 
or expressed concern. The results are charted below. 
Judge Judge Judge People's Weekly 
Judy Joe Mathis Court Mean184 
Brown 
PLAINTIFFS 73 76 79 87 19.7185 
TYPE OF CASE 
Contract 13 15 20 37 5 
Personal injury 20 19 17 18 4.6 
Property damage 18 22 26 26 5.75 
Family 22 20 16 6 4 
REMEDy186 
$ > $100 2 15 8 11 2.25 
$100 - $499 45 35 42 48 10.6 
$500-$1,500 19 14 18 19 4.4 
Over $1,500 7 12 11 9 2.4 
Return 6 8 3 9 1.6 
of property187 
Al)ology188 7 12 21 22 3.9 
182 This was later calculated to determine the average number of plaintiffs per 
week. 
183 Cataloguing between the Student and Law Coders was then compared. Be-
cause the key was to discern the messages that the audience would take away from 
syndi-court, rather than technical, legal accuracy, syndi-court episodes that were coded 
differently (18 or 5%) by the Law and Student Coders were excluded from the final 
tally. 
184 The per week mean of the total sample = 21. Thus, a viewer of one show would 
see approximately 1092 plaintiffs per year. 
The mean for the full sample of syndi-court plaintiffs = 83.25. (The number of plain-
tiffs per week after filtering in the coding process = 78.75; the raw number of plaintiffs 
per year = 1092). 
185 This would amount to 1024 plaintiffs per year. 
186 This looks at only damages sought, not damages awarded. 
187 That is, the plaintiff sought the return of property in addition to monetary 
damages or as an alternate to monetary damages. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/2
2004] THE MONSTER IN THE TELEVISION 265 
B. THE JUROR PROTOCOU89 
241 prospective jurors from Manhattan, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Hackensack, New Jersey completed a survey in-
strument. 190 This instrument measured, among other things, 
syndi-court viewing habits and expressed propensity toward 
both litigation191 and pro se litigation. 192 After incomplete sur-
veys and those demonstrating obvious English language barri-
ers were discarded, the remaining 225 (93.3%) were analyzed. 
To isolate any connection between syndi-court viewing and 
certain factors contemplated by the questionnaire, respondents 
were then identified as either frequent viewers [FV] or non-
viewers [NV].193 Of the 225 juror analyzed responses, 149 
(66.2%) were FV and 76 (33.78%) NY. 
As summarized below, statistically significant differences 
emerged between the FV and NY responses to questions meas-
uring propensities toward pro se representation (P< .05).194 Ad-
188 That is, during the presentation of her case, the plaintiff requested an apology 
or explained their motivation for suit was to obtain an apology. 
189 Data from this study pertaining to how syndi-court representations affect juror 
opinions about judge behavior appear in Podlas, supra note 152. 
190 Prior to entering the courthouse (and, in some instances, during breaks), indi-
viduals were approached, identified as appearing for jury duty, and asked to complete a 
questionnaire. (No individual believed to be a juror was excluded). In exchange for 
their participation, jurors received candy bars and the elite pens used to complete the 
questionnaires. 
ney 
191 I _ would consider bringing a claim in court 
I _ would NOT consider bringing a claim in court 
I _ would bring a claim in court 
I _ would NOT bring a claim in court 
192 I _ would consider representing myself in court without the aid of an attor-
I _ would NOT consider representing myself in court without the aid of an 
attorney 
If I was unable to afford an attorney, 
I _ would appear in court without the aid of an attorney 
I _ would NOT appear in court without the aid of an attorney 
193 A "frequent viewer" watched syndi-court between two to three times and more 
than five times per week (and checked the corresponding response on the descriptive 
scale of viewing). Non-viewers did not watch syndi-courts or did so, at most, once per 
week (and checked the appropriate response on the corresponding descriptive scale). 
This denomination is also consistent with Gerbner's division of society into "heavy 
viewers" and non-viewers. 
1 .. P is the "probability level," SD = standard deviation from the mean, M stands 
for "mean," and a z score calculates significance." 
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ditionally, statistically significant differences (P< .05) emerged 
between FV and NV responses to questions measuring propen-
sities toward litigiousness.19s 
Litigiousness and Pro Se Propensities 
Sample Would Would Would Would 
consider appear consider bring claim 
appearing pro se bringing 
pro se claim 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
FV=149 .55 .50 .59 .49 .86 .35 .75 .44 
NV=76 .16 .37 .184 .39 .76 .43 .50 .50 
z value 6.65' 6.76' 1.77' 3.65' 
C. THE JURy-ELIGIBLE [ELIGIBLES] PROTOCOL 
A subsequent study sought to replicate these results as 
well as to explore whether the attitudes and propensities to-
ward pro se representation were mediated by degree of risk! 
jeopardy. 
Over two semesters, a one-page survey instrument was 
distributed to 148 jury-eligible adults on the r t or 2nd day of 
class in an introductory-level business law course.196 The in-
strument included all of the questions from the Juror question-
naire as well as questions pertaining to law viewing habits and 
propensity toward self-representation in various civil and 
criminal contexts.197 Researchers later translated these self-
representation scenarios into "high risk" and "low risk" catego-
ries as shown below.198 
195 While statistically significant, these differences were not quite as pronounced. 
196 These respondents ranged in age from 18-21 and were either second-semester 
freshmen or sophomores. 
197 Because this study was originally contemplated to be independent of and se-
quential to the Juror Study, its questions were broader. 
198 Risk! Jeopardy was assessed as follows: 
Civil, low: $0-$1,500 
high: above $1,500 
Criminal, low: fines up to $1,500 
Probation 
Up to 3 days in jail 
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After incomplete or internally inconsistent surveys were 
discarded, the remaining 142 (96%) were analyzed. 91 (64%) 
were FV; 41 (36%) were NV. 
As summarized below, statistically significant differences 
again emerged between the frequent and non-frequent viewers 
(P<.05).199 This time, however, those differences were apparent 
only at the low risk! jeopardy levels. No difference was found 
when respondents contemplated high risk! jeopardy situations. 
Rather, it appeared that, where respondents were faced with 
high levels of risk! jeopardy, they rejected the potential of pro 
se representation, notwithstanding viewing profiles. 
Litigiousness and Pro Se Propensities 
Sample Would 
consider 
bringing 
claim 
M SD 
FV=91 .85 .40 
NV=51 .69 .47 
high: fines above $1,500 
weeks, months in jail 
1 yr. or more imprisonment 
Would 
bring 
claim 
M SD 
.82 .42 
.63 .49 
Would Would 
consider appear 
appearing pro se 
_pro se 
M SD M SD 
.64 .50 .62 .50 
.31 .47 .28 .45 
199 Additionally, an earlier study sampled 88 college students who had either 
completed or were currently enrolled in an introductory-level business course. Of the 
88 questionnaires completed, 22 were excluded from analysis (25%). Of the remaining 
64, 45 (70.3%) were FV and 19 (29.69%) NV (as defined by the Juror Study). 
Although statistically significant results were found, due to the high number of re-
spondents excluded, the subsequent study of Juror Eligible adults described herein was 
undertaken. Nevertheless, the results of the initial study are shown below. 
Expressed Propensity For Self-Representation 
Level of Risk! FV(n=45) NV(n=19) 
Jeopardy 
X SD X SD z value 
civil low .62 .49 .26 .452 2.625* 
criminal low .64 .484 .32 .478 5.13* 
civil high .20 .405 .105 .315 1.11 
criminal high .022 .149 .05 .229 .642 
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Level of Risk! 
Jeopardy 
civil low 
Criminal low 
civil high 
Criminal high 
Pro Se Propensity as per Risk / Jeopardy 
(Eligibles) 
FV (n=91) NV(n=51) 
M SD M SD 
.63 .49 .30 .46 
.58 .50 .24 .43 
.07 .25 .08 .27 
.04 .75 .08 .27 
D. META-ANALYSIS 
A meta-analysis of the analyzed responses of the Eligibles 
and Jurors was conducted on the questions posed in both inves-
tigations, i.e., those pertaining to contemplation of litigation, 
likelihood of pursuing litigation, and doing so pro se. This 
meta-analysis yielded a total of 367 responses of which 240 
(65%) were FV and 127 (35%) were NV. 
These results conformed to those of the Juror and Eligibles 
studies. Once again, there was a striking similarity in re-
sponse based on viewing: 
Litigiousness and Pro Se Propensities 
Sample Would Would Would Would 
consider bring consider appear 
bringing claim appearing pro se 
claim pro se 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
FV= 240 .85 .35 .78 .41 .58 .50 .60 .49 
NV= 127 .73 .44 .30 .46 .24 .43 .20 .40 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/2
2004] THE MONSTER IN THE TELEVISION 
Meta-Analysis Proportions 
90.------------------------------------------. 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
o 
consider bring claim consider appear pro 
bringing pro se se 
claim 
Meta-Analysis Proportions 
90.-------------------------~---------------, 
40 
0+-----~----~------~----~----~----__4 
consider bring claim consider appear pro 
bringing pro se se 
claim 
269 
31
Podlas: The Monster in the Television
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
270 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. NORMS OF LITIGIOUSNESS 
The data demonstrate that frequent viewers of syndi-court 
hold a number of views regarding litigation that not only differ 
from those held by non-viewers, but also conform to the pre-
dominant imagery of the syndi-court genre. Moreover, these 
are expressed as propensities toward action. First, the Juror 
and Eligibles Studies demonstrate that frequent viewers ex-
press a propensity toward pro se representation, whereas non-
viewers do not. As clarified by the Eligibles Study, this differ-
ence is evident only in the "low risk! jeopardy" categories/oo the 
situations most resembling those of syndi-court as well as those 
reflected in the mythology of litigiousness. Notably, no differ-
ence is apparent in "high risk! jeopardy" situations. Second, 
both studies show that frequent viewers are more disposed to-
ward considering and pursuing litigation than are non-
viewers.20l The Eligibles expressed this in even greater propor-
tions than did the Jurors.202 This suggests that syndi-court is a 
normative messenger of litigation. Its effect, however, is not to 
discourage litigious tendencies, but, rather, to encourage them. 
Specifically, syndi-court publicizes (accurately or not) a cultural 
acceptance of suit, commonality of pro se representation, and 
the courtroom as a forum for all manner of disputes. 
It is hard to turn on daytime television without seeing 
syndi-court litigants and their "causes." It seems that anyone 
can sue and that everyone does. With this vivid normative 
backdrop, it is hardly surprising that viewers hold attitudes 
favoring litigation. After all, syndi-court shows us that litiga-
tion is engaged in by many regular folk: it is neither reserved 
200 Although frequent viewers opt for self-representation at a level beyond that of 
non-viewers, the type of case or degree of risk involved might temper this desire. The 
pro se response appears where jeopardy (either punitive or economic) to the pro se 
litigant is low but dissipates when jeopardy increases. 
201 Moreover, where responses of frequent viewers and non-viewers are closest 
proportionally, it does not appear that both groups begin to move toward a center, but 
that non-viewers begin to look more like those of frequent viewers. 
202 The Eligibles were younger than the Jurors and had at least one year of college 
education. 
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for the rich nor practiced only by the deviant.203 Rather, litiga-
tion is common and appropriate behavior.204 
The types of disputes prevalent on syndi-court also en-
courage litigious tendencies. As demonstrated by the content 
analysis,205 on syndi-court, every dispute and middling amount 
of money justifies a day in court. In fact, a majority of dispu-
tants sued for less than $500. Moreover, the plaintiffs and sto-
ries provide to viewers a "short-cut" cost-benefit analysis of 
pursuing litigation, albeit a truncated one. Viewers can see 
that, apparently, the benefits to litigation outweigh its costs. 
Though the public would ideally need to compare the disputes 
litigated with those not litigated, when syndi-litigants sue over 
a few dollars, what could possibly qualify as a non-litigable 
situation? One can only conclude that there is no situation in 
which litigation is not the answer. Consequently, when com-
paring their own disputes to those of syndi-court, viewers will 
be inclined to complain formally.206 
The character of disputes broadcast may even communi-
cate that litigation about moral issues or "because of the prin-
ciple" is socially appropriate. The courtroom, then, is trans-
formed from an adversarial tribunal of last resort to a thera-
peutic mechanism.207 "Therapeutic justice is the study of the 
role of law as a "therapeutic agent. "208 Thus, the act of litigat-
ing is what the person wants -litigation is the primary remedy 
that she seeks - and through this public expression in the way 
203 That is, litigation is not practiced by only by the deviant . 
... This also supports the heuristic processing model of cultivation effects. L.J. 
Shrum, Media Consumption and Perceptions of Reality: Effects and Underlying Proc-
esses, in Media Effects, Advances in Theory and Research, at 78. In short, television 
viewing enhances construct accessibility, and, because particular televised concepts are 
accessible to viewers, viewers tend to overestimate the frequency or likelihood of those 
events. Id. at 78-79. 
205 See infra pp. 37. 
206 This litigious empowerment could also encourage litigants to push their issue 
more vehemently and for higher monetary awards than previously seen. 
207 For a discussion of the role of therapeutic justice in dispute settlement, see 
Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying The 
Lens of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 155, 158-60 (1998) [hereinafter 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence]; Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in 
Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 Hastings. L. J. 703, 705-06, 714-16 (1997). 
208 Waldman [Therapeutic Jurisprudence], supra note 206, at 158. Hence, law 
and litigating produces therapeutic (or anti-therapeutic) consequences. 
Though therapeutic justice originated within the mental health filed, it has more re-
cently been extended to how existing law can be interpreted or applied in a therapeutic 
manner. Id. at 158-59. 
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of claiming, the plaintiff seeks to feel better or be made whole. 
If lucky, the plaintiff will get her pound of flesh; if not, at least 
she will have engaged in the socially endorsed process for clo-
sure. 
The promotion of pro se litigation also has ramifications 
for litigation generally. In both studies, a substantial portion 
of frequent viewers stated that they would consider and pursue 
pro se litigation, although the propensity to do so was tempered 
by the type of legal situation involved.209 While showcasing liti-
gants operating without counsel certainly encourages this 
model, it also enables litigation overall. 
Since the rise of syndi-court, several employees of the jus-
tice system have noted an increase in pro se litigants.21o 
Though exact numbers are hard to come by,2l1 increases in self-
representation are significant. 212 In fact, judges have com-
mented that syndi-courts appear to embolden pro se litiga-
209 Another national survey, 58% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement, "It would be possible for me to represent myself in court .... " Jona 
Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Chal-
lenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 36, 37 (2002) [hereinafter Strug-
gle for Access). 
210 Russell Engler, And Justice For All - Including The Underrepresented Poor: 
Revisiting The Roles Of The Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987 
(1999) (pro se litigants "flooding the courts"); L. Karl Branting, An Advisory System 
For Pro Se Protection Order Applicants, 14 Int'l Rev. L., Comps., & Tech. 357 (2000) 
(increasing numbers of litigants represent themselves in court); Alan Feuer, More 
Litigants Are Taking a Do-It-Yourself Tack, N.Y. Times [Late Ed., East Coast), Jan. 22, 
2001, at B1 (pro se litigants increasing, quoting New York State Deputy Chief Admin-
istrative Judge, Juanita Bing Newton); Chris Mahoney, Verdict: Litigants Without 
Attorneys Are On The Rise, 20 Bar Bus. J., Sep. 1, 2000, at 13 (recounting claims of 
court officials); Daisy Whitney, Well-Documented "People" Company Helps Do-It-
Yourselfers With Legal Tasks, Denver Post, August 3,1999, at C-01 (increase in pro se 
litigation over past 5 years, quoting spokesperson for Colorado Judicial Department). 
211 Raul v. Esquivel, III, The Ability Of The Indigent To Access The Legal Process 
In Family Law Matters, 1 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 79, 90 (2000); Mahoney, supra, note 209, 
at 13 (overall figures of pro se litigants are hard to come by). 
212 Jona Goldschmidt, Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and 
Guidebook For Judges and Court Managers 49 (1998); Struggle for Access, supra note 
208,36-38. 
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of pro se litigants in 
divorce cases, Mahoney, supra note 209 (in 75% of divorce cases, at least 1 spouse is 
pro se); Terry Carter, Self-Help Speeds Up, 87 AB.A J., July 2001, at 34 ("Growing pro 
se representation problem in bankruptcy courts"), and federal criminal appeals, Peter 
J. Ausili, Outside Counsel: Federal Court Statistics For Fiscal Year 1997, N.Y. L. J. 
April 28, 1998, at 1 (reporting that filings have increased slightly each year since 
1993); cf. Feuer, supra note 209, at B1 (courtwatchers attribute increase in pro se 
litigation, in part, to abundance of court programs on television). 
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tion.213 Because people now see what occurs inside the court-
room, they believe that they are capable of litigating on their 
own behalf.214 One assistant court executive even related an 
exchange with a pro se litigant who explained that he and his 
wife obtained all of their information about the courts from 
watching Judge Judy.215 
When aggrieved individuals cannot afford legal fees, they 
may forgo assertion of their rights.216 Pro se representation, 
however, provides a way around this hurdle of expense. Pro se 
representation, therefore, transforms into litigants individuals 
who would otherwise be economically-barred from the court-
room.217 Indeed, some have asserted that the recent increase in 
pro se litigation is due to the lack of affordable legal services 
for the poor and middle class.218 For example, a New York 
State Bar Association survey concluded that the cost of legal 
services219 persuades middle income New Yorkers to represent 
213 Struggle for Access, supra note 208, at 37-38. 
Those judges also fear that syndi-court sends the wrong signal to those litigants creat-
ing unreasonable expectations about the ease of interaction with the court system, id. 
("Judges Wapner, Mills, and Judy have created unreasonable expectation about the 
ease of interaction with the court system."), including the expectation that the judge to 
assist them as ersatz counsel, id. (self-represen4!d parties expect court to represent 
them, that court will be the pro se defender). 
214 Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel, 
And The Judge: A Proposal For Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 789, 816 
(2000). 
"On television, it looks simple enough: You go to court. You make your case ... [alfter a 
few moments - and a commercial break - the judge renders a decision." Dante Chinni, 
More Americans Want to be Their Own Perry Mason, Christian Sci. Monitor, August 
20,2001. 
215 Id. Another pro se plaintiff considered his watching the Simpson trial a suffi-
cient legal education. Feuer, supra note 209, at B1. 
21. But see Paquin, supra note 96, at 30 (in empirical study of litigious personali-
ties, few respondents mentioned cost as barrier to litigation or reason underlying deci-
sion to sue or not to sue). 
217 Chinni, supra note 213 (some litigants go pro se because hiring a lawyer is 
cost-prohibitive). 
This paper considers only whether syndi-court may heighten potential for suit, thus, 
increasing litigation risk to business. It attempts to avoid any value judgment as to 
whether there exist benefits to syndi-courts. 
218 Engler, supra note 209 at 1987; Struggle for Access, supra note 208, at 36 (cost 
oflawyers has contributed to increase in pro se litigation); Janet Reno, Address Deliv-
ered at the Celebration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Women at Fordham Law 
School, 63 Ford. L. Rev. 5, 8 (1994) (at least 80% of poor and "working poor" have no 
access to legal services). 
219 Or least their perceived cost. Gary Spencer, Middle-Income Consumers Seen 
Handling Legal Matters Pro Se, N.Y. L.J. May 29, 1996, at 1. 
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themselves.22o Syndi-court thus demonstrates that pro se rep-
resentation is both a reasonable alternative to representation 
by paid counsel and something that virtually anyone can han-
dle.221 
Similarly, the promotion of pro se litigation encourages 
litigiousness by eliminating another hurdle into the courtroom: 
a weak legal claim. Usually, an individual cannot litigate 
unless a lawyer accepts her case. A lawyer, however, will often 
refuse representation if a claim is specious or the likelihood of 
success and monetary recovery is 10w.222 Therefore, much as 
the expense of counsel may prevent people from suing, so may 
an attorney refusal.223 Yet, when a person chooses to bring her 
claim pro se, she circumvents the effect of attorney refusal and 
can initiate litigation despite the weakness of her claim.224 
Ironically, business's promotion of the mythology of liti-
giousness and rampant overclaiming may have laid the 
groundwork for the syndi-court-inspired litigation to play the 
litigation 10ttery.225 The imagery reinforces the sense that the 
system is so routinely abused that one would be a fool not to 
play the game,226 and it makes people believe that "if anything 
220 Id. "Middle income" was defined as $25,000 - $95,000. Id. 
221 Struggle for Access, supra note 208 (increased literacy and sense of rugged 
individualism contribute to pro se litigation); Chinni, supra at note 213 (television 
makes self-representation look simple enough; reporting 1999 survey from National 
Center for the State courts finding that 58% of American believe that they could repre-
sent themselves, if necessary). 
222 Saks, supra note 2, at 1190-92; Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 484 (in light 
of court costs and strength of cases, 57% of average lawyers are signing up a smaller 
percentage of clients than 5 years ago). "As a result, the client with a small, but le-
gitimate claim may not be able to find a competent attorney, or have his or her claim 
successfully settled." Id. at 485. 
223 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 486. Lawyers state that they now screen 
cases and litigants much more harshly. One Houston litigator explained, "We look for 
a client with no prior problems. It makes a good impression .... " Id. 
224 Although this is not equivalent to recovering a large cash settlement, as ex-
plained above, it will create an expense. 
225 Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 747 ("corporate investment in projecting an image 
of unrestrained litigiousness and rampant overclaiming may have the paradoxical 
effect of increasing the level of claiming"); see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 
459-74 (business and industry allies created and marketed vision of rampant litiga-
tion). 
Publicity about the litigation explosion may increase calls to lawyers, as perceived 
plaintiffs believe that any misstep will amount to some amount of monetary compensa-
tion. Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 747 (litigation rhetoric makes people believe that if 
anything goes wrong they can get significant compensation). 
226 Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 747. 
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goes wrong they can get significant compensation. "227 This cre-
ates a self-fulfilling prophecy encouraging individuals to bring 
claims.228 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
The key to understanding whether an individual will for-
mally dispute is discerning that person's social construction of 
litigious reality - to this person, what is a legal wrong, what is 
law for, and how or when is it appropriate to use litigation? 229 
Consequently, when we seek to quantify litigious decisions via 
individual rationality,230 we must refer to norms and under-
standings of litigation.231 In fact, to the degree that people ap-
pear to behave irrationally232 as calculated by traditionallitiga-
tion management, it can be explained by reference to norms. 233 
Once the desire to follow social norms is incorporated into our 
understanding of litigious choices,234 any anomalies of rational 
choice become explainable.235 AE, syndi-court influences the 
construction of that normative firmament,236 it influences the 
litigious tendencies and choices of the public. 
227 Id. 
228 Conniving Claimant, supra note 15, at 647, 662. 
229 Daniels & Martin, supra note 5, at 453 (environment of civil litigation includes 
what is an injury, whom to blame, and how to respond to others). 
230 Id. Hence, there is normative rationality. Jules Coleman, Risk and Reason 
46-47 (1992) (conceptions of morality are influenced by cultural norms; rationality 
linked to norms). 
231 Birke & Fox, supra note 43, at 15. For instance, plaintiffs may believe that 
litigation is easy and inexpensive. Legal expertise and concrete reality become largely 
irrelevant. Putative plaintiffs may harbor what Birke and Fox have called "positive 
illusions," essentially unrealistic optimism regarding outcomes. 
232 Or deviate from economic predictions of action. 
233 Sunstein, supra note 79, at 909, 940. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 941. 
238 See Jolls et al., supra note 47 at 1474. (normative judgments are both predic-
tive and non-arbitrary). 
To some degree, syndi-court episodes resemble Galanter's legal legends, i.e., that "set of 
legends that is resilient and that resonate with many of the basic themes of our legal 
culture .... " Oil Strike, supra note 27, at 722. Generally, these accounts are not based 
on personal contact, but on something one has heard about. Id. These legendary ac-
counts obtain even greater distinction as the media distributes them to diverse audi-
ences. Id. at 722-23 (legal legends widely disseminated and media plays major role in 
disseminating them). 
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There are several implications for the results.237 The liti-
gious propensities and norms favoring (or at least not disfavor-
ing) disputing, low-end disputing, and pro se representation 
may be expressed in the consumer-business context in a num-
ber of ways. First, these may prompt an increase in formal 
complaining by consumers. This does not necessarily mean 
that consumers will suddenly buy a product and then file suit 
for every warranted failure or psychic injury. Rather, consum-
ers may be more inclined to complain "officially" and seek some 
remediation. This remediation may be in the form of a refund, 
a de minimis settlement, or an apology or admission. Of 
course, the more formal a complaint is, the more likely it be-
comes that the complaint will escalate into a formal legal dis-
pute. Nevertheless, again, these reflect a continuum of disput-
ing, i.e., filing in small claims, filing in state civil court, or seek-
ing class certification. In the end, more plaintiffs or more peo-
ple even considering the preliminary steps toward suit, means 
greater expense at the low end of disputing. 
Second, the litigious propensities imply a particular char-
acter to complaints, specifically, those involving low monetary 
sums, seeking low monetary settlements or some type of moral 
redress.238 Believing that legal action is warranted or seeing the 
courtroom as a venue of last resort when a business defendant 
fails to apologize might yield consumer litigants increasingly 
prone to pursue relatively minor (at least in terms of rational 
economic assessments) litigation. Hence, business may notice 
an increase in "pocket-change"cases or small-claims cases pre-
viously unheard of. 
Third, the inclination toward litigation could encourage 
putative plaintiffs to pursue novel claims.239 Indeed, there has 
237 This article does not consider whether increased consumer litigation is good or 
bad, but merely notes that it may increase due to the confluence of factors noted above, 
and considers the ways in which this might be reflected in consumer-to-business dis-
puting. 
238 Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using the Legal Process to Teach Negotiation, 
34 J. Legal Educ. 268, 268 (1984).This might be an expression of "litigotiation." As 
coined by Marc Galanter, litigotiation is a combination of negotiation and litigation, or 
the strategic pursuit of settlement by mobilizing the court process. 
2311 Neil Vidmar & Regina Schuller, Individual Differences and the Pursuit of 
Legal Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry, 11 L. & Human Behav. 299, 300-02 (1987). Such 
litigiousness might reflect or interact with one's "claims consciousness." Id. Vidmar 
and Schuller have identified personal "claims consciousness" that is affected by a range 
off actors such as personality and socio-economic status. Id. 
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been a spate of novel litigation of late. For instance, this past 
Fall, Rhode Island became the first state to sue lead paint 
manufacturers on the theory that they had created a public 
nuisance.24o Over the last year, cities in Massachusetts, Cali-
fornia, and New Jersey sued gun manufacturers, asserting that 
they systematically ignore evidence that firearms shops ille-
gally sell firearms to individuals with criminal records, make 
unsafe weapons, and fail to make such dangers known to the 
public.241 Last year, attorneys began to press claims for slavery 
reparations from both the government and corporate Amer-
ica.242 Though novel claims are exciting for legal theorists, they 
are frightening for business decision-makers, as they smack of 
risk that is not merely unforeseen but unforeseeable. Looking 
to statistical support for propositions they can rely on and inte-
grating into risk calculations understandings of litigious pro-
pensities can help business mitigate the biases that infect its 
litigation assessments. 
As noted, verdicts, let alone large ones, are highly un-
usua1.243 Studies show that jurors are actually biased against 
plaintiffs244 and distrustful of their motives.245 Perhaps the liti-
240 Peter B. Lord, Jury Deadlock in Rhode Island Forces Mistrial in Suit Against 
Paint Firms, Providence J., October 30, 2002 ("Rhode Island took novel approach of 
accusing [lead paint] companies of creating a public nuisance"). 
241 David Abel, Gun Control Forces Say Suits to Go On, Despite Boston's Choice to 
End Effort, Boston Globe, March 29, 2002 (33 cities suing gun manufacturers); Tom 
Schoenberg, D.C. Judge Holds Fire: Still No Ruling in City's Novel Suit Over Gun 
Violence, Legal Times, May 20, 2002, at P. 1 (D.C. suit against 25 gun manufacturers 
from violating district's Assault Weapons Strict Liability Act of 1990); Joseph W. 
Cleary, Municipalities Versus Gun Manufacturers: Why Public Nuisance Claims Just 
Do Not Work, 31 U. BaIt. L. Rev. 273, 283 (suing gun manufacturers under public 
nuisance theory is novel) (2002). A number of "novel legal theories underpinO" these 
cases. Id. 
In June of 2001, shareholders sued WorldCom executives accusing them of a scheme to 
keep earnings and WorldCom's stock price high. Beatrice E. Garcia, Many WorldCom 
Executives Knew Score, Lawsuit Says, Miami Herald, August 5, 2002. Two class 
action suits were also filed against investment banks Morgan Stanley and Credit 
Suisse First Boston, brought by investors against analysts. Chambliss, supra note 32 
at 35 ("There are novel legal problems associated with these suits"). 
242 James E. Watson, Lawyers Plan to Sue U.S. Government, Business For Slav-
ery Reparations, Legal Times, April 13, 2001; see also Walter K. Olson, The Rule of 
Lawyers: How the New Litigation Elite Threatens America's Rule of Law 13-20 (2003) 
(recounting variety of recent, novel legal claims) . 
..... Vidmar, supra note 67, at 875-76 (damages fuel public debates about tort re-
form, but trend oflarge damage awards is not supported empirically) . 
... Shari Seidman Diamond, et aI., Juror Judgments About Liability and Dam-
ages: Sources of Variability and Ways To Increase Consistency, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 301, 
307 (1998); Business, supra note 2 at 75. Some mock juror studies indicate that those 
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gation rhetoric has had some of its pro-business desired effect. 
Therefore, the real threat for business is not that plaintiffs will 
suddenly win huge judgments at trial,246 rendering businesses 
economic paraplegics, but that people who would never have 
considered disputing now will. Consequently, rather than an-
choring cost-benefit analysis to the fear of multi-million dollar 
judgments, litigation management should focus on increases in 
low-end or introductory disputing. Furthermore, litigation as-
sessments must integrate the motivation behind litigation, 
such as its normative expectations, its therapeutic use, and its 
use as a mechanism to extract an apology. 
Short of changing products247 or the legallandscape,248 the 
data indicate that disputing is not likely to decrease. Conse-
quently, business should concentrate on methods to prevent 
disputes from mutating into full-blown litigation, be it in small 
claims or civil court. Resolving disputes at lower levels is usu-
ally more cost-effective and less disruptive to business prac-
tices than litigation.249 In fact, some lawyers have also redes-
who support tort reform are more likely to be negatively disposed toward plaintiffs, Id., 
or at least approach toward interpreting evidence in favor of defendants, see generally 
Business, supra note 2, at 75-6 . 
... See Vidmar, supra note 67, at 868-70. Empirical evidence does not support 
claims that juries favor seriously injured plaintiffs at the expense of business. Id. at 
870 (relying on studies by Viscusi, Daniels & Martin, and Hans), though juries may 
hold business to a "reasonable corporation standard." For a more complete discussion 
of this theory, see Valerie Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business Liti-
gation, 79 Judicature 242, 246-47 (1996) and Business, supra note 2, at 9. 
246 MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 665 (most cases filed do not result in trial). 
247 George Priest has argued that where business does not purchase insurance, it 
is less prone to engage in risky behavior. George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis 
and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 (1987). Simply if business knows that its 
costs are covered, it does no t have an adequate incentive to keep those costs down, via 
improved, safer products. Id . 
... Virtually every state has considered punitive damages caps. Glaberson, supra 
note 67, at a25 (since 1980's, virtually every state has considered tort reform, including 
in punitive damages limits). Most have passed legislation intended in some way to 
limit tort lawsuits. Id; Eisenberg supra note 64, at 768-69 (several states have statu-
tory caps on punitive damages). 
:1<9 Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the 
Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 Ohio St. J. 
Disp. Resol. 1, 17 (1998) (describing ADR: "If you fix it earlier and lower, you keep the 
dollars"); Caroline Harris Crowne, Note: The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 
1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1768, 1771 (2001) 
(describing benefits of using ADR to resolve disputes with business without going to 
court). 
As is dispute avoidance altogether. Ann L. MacNaughton & Gary A. Munneke, Practis-
ing Law Across Geographic and Professional Borders: What Does the Future Hold?, 47 
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igned the way that small-dollar-amount disputes are handled 
so as to provide for early settlement. 250 
The results here underscore the importance of responding 
to low-end consumer disputes. When a consumer complainant 
does not get her pound of flesh upon direct contact with the 
business or when she wishes to extract an apology, she may be 
prone to seek her day in court. It seems that an increasing 
number of individuals balance on this precipice of litigation 
and can easily be swayed to sue. Therefore, although business 
or its customer service may have previously employed a strat-
egy of initial response that declines or deflects all responsibil-
ity, it may wish to rethink that. Regardless of the objectively 
sound sources of refusal, lack of acknowledgement will not 
make a complainant feel that her complaints have been seri-
ously considered.251 The perception of fairness is critical. In 
fact, being treated fairly has been shown to be at least as im-
portant to litigants252 as the ultimate outcome.253 Some people 
are even willing to harm themselves just to punish those that 
they believe are acting unfairly. 2M Moreover, litigants have 
long memories of unfair treatment.255 
Hence, refusal will not amount to finality for the con-
sumer, but will be a signal that the consumer need go further 
to obtain the rightful admission or remedy. The consumer may 
now harbor ill feelings that her complaint has been either re-
jected out of hand or simply ignored. As shown here, it may 
prompt a plaintiff to formalize the action or to take the next 
step into the courtroom. Additionally, this quantification of 
Loy. L. Rev. 665, 707 (2001) (advocating that business implement dispute system de-
sign projects to avoid and manage disputes). 
250 McEwen, supra note 248, at 19. 
251 MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 697. This feeling off air treatment is critical, for 
if the litigant believes the process has been unfair, she may not opt for voluntary reso-
lution of the dispute. Id. at 697. Fairness may include recognition by the defendant of 
the putative plaintiffs complaint and/or desired remedy, as well as simply not being 
ignored. Id. 
252 Birke & Fox, supra note 43, at 38 (some litigants are more sensitive to how 
they've been treated than to how they have fared objectively). 
253 See MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 681 (with regard to claiming, "individual 
expectations are reflected in how each party understands a fair and appropriate out-
come" for the dispute at hand). 
254 Id.; Jolls et aI., supra note 47, at 21-22 (studies demonstrate that people are 
willing to punish unfair behavior even at cost to themselves). 
2M MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 703. These persistent and detailed recollections 
of an earlier affront can derail settlement or final resolution. 
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justice or fairness is tenuous. The "principle of the matter" 
may overshadow a simple concrete dispute/56 thus causing the 
substantive issue to mutate.257 In such instances, the norma-
tive issues may come to dominate the dispute.258 In fact, one 
unit of a company adopted such a "tough guy" culture with re-
gard to complaints that it tended to generate disputes and 
prompt litigation!259 Similarly, another company counsel noted 
that its business people so often insisted that they were right, 
that disputes grew into full-blown litigation, naming the com-
pany as a defendant.26o 
Each company must calibrate its own unique response sys-
tem to consumer complaints. Yet, in addition to considering 
the type of business, the nature of complaints, and the costs of 
claims, a response strategy should also offer to consumers a 
few ounces of flesh. People want apologies and minor sums, so 
business should seriously consider giving them exactly that. 
Ultimately, the cost of the olive branch,261 i.e., appeasing the 
complainant or doing the right thing, could be far less than 
that of prolonging a dispute. A truly minor sum or even the 
coveted "we are sorry," might go a long way toward settling a 
dispute. For instance, business could replace refusal letters 
with a "We're sorry letter/ Here's the check letter/ Waiver let-
ter." Hence, business would send a letter expressing regret but 
not guilt, enclosing a minimal check (for a minimal claim) 
whose endorsement waives any future claim. This gives the 
consumer an apology and a dose of therapy. When priced out 
with reference to product costs, this duo limits the consumer's 
incentive to continue the dispute. 
Moreover, though institutionalizing claims payments in 
this way may seem radical, if payments per year represent only 
a portion of insurance and legal costs devoted to this class of 
256 Id. at 692. MacFarlane describes the situation where "a straightforward claim 
on an unpaid account develops into an argument over treatment of this particular 
client or customer, or assertions of discourtesy or rudeness .... " 
257 Id. (as the conflict develops over a period of time, the importance of the original 
issue may be replaced by subsequent issues of treatment). 
258 Id. at 693. 
259 McEwen, supra note 249, at 9-10. 
260 Id. at 10 ("We're the defendant almost all of the time. Our business people 
think they're [always) 
right .... "). 
261 PR News, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting crisis litigation consultant, "The check 
you write today is the smallest check you're ever going to write"). 
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complaints, it could ultimately reduce costs. In particular, this 
type of self-insurance could cause insurance rates to de-
crease/62 since one of the purported ramifications of litigious-
ness is that it increases insurance costS.263 Yet, one author as-
serts that it is not so much actual litigation costs that increase 
insurance premiums but the irrational fear of lawsuits: insur-
ers insist on excessive reserves and products are not pro-
duced/54 rates increase, and market opportunities are lost. 
Furthermore, insurance companies control pricing to their 
benefit and, when addressing claims, engage in tactics that 
increase animosity and delay settlement. These also increase 
litigation and insurance costs. Self-managing litigation risk, 
however, much like opting for a higher deductible to obtain a 
lower insurance rate, can save money by accurately placing 
money on risk. Doing so also redirects dollars to satisfying low-
end claims and maintaining good will/65 which, in the long run, 
may be a better self-maximizing strategy for the company. 
Moreover, making an initial offer permits business to ex-
ploit anchoring biases held by plaintiffs. Psychological re-
search shows that people tend to make numerical judgments 
based on an initial value, even if this value is irrational or arbi-
trary. This is known as anchoring or anchoring bias.266 Once a 
monetary sum is mentioned, all other assessments or negotia-
tions are anchored or made with reference to this sum.267 
26'2 Cf. Brown, supra note 20, at DSI (consumer litigation causes insurance rates 
to increase). (consumer litigation leads to "increase[d] insurance rates"); see Saks, 
supra note 2, at 1157-58 (insurers insist on excessive monetary reserves to protect 
against possibility of lawsuit); but see Joey Bunch, Mississippi Lawyer Says Medical 
Malpractice Problem Lies in Insurance Industry, Sun Herald, July 3, 2002 (stating that 
caps do not lower insurance rates, quoting Melvin Cooper, President of Magnolia Bar 
Association). 
263 Third-party insurance is to protect oneself against liability for judgments. 
Coleman, supra note 229, at 205. 
264 In other words, business has fallen prey to its own rhetoric. See Saks, supra 
note 2, at 1157-58; Brown, supra note 262, at DSI (consumer litigation leads to "in-
crease[d] insurance rates"). 
,.. Scalet, supra note 15, at 64. "As a rule, it's cheaper for companies to make 
confidential settlements than to defend themselves." 
,.. For an analysis of impact of anchoring on judgments, see Chris Guthrie, Jef-
frey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging By Heuristic, Cognitive illusions 
in Judicial Decision-Making, 86 Judicature 44 (July-August 2002). 
267 Birke & Fox, supra note 43, at 40. Of course, as argued supra pp. 9-13, busi-
ness commonly anchors its estimates oflikely jury awards in high figures. 
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C. EMPIRICAL CONCERNS 
Although the propositions here are supported by both 
common sense and the data presented, it cannot be ascertained 
whether syndi-court does, indeed, cultivate attitudes toward 
litigation or whether such attitudes exist independent of syndi-
court viewing. Cultivation investigations, like many social sci-
ence investigations, simply cannot distinguish causation from 
correlation. Therefore, it is possible that the propensities fa-
voring litigation and pro se representation catalog individual 
predispositions toward the litigiousness "plaguing" society, 
rather than proving that syndi-court is a mechanism of norma-
tive cultivation. Personality type might also explain the ap-
parent correlations: the type of person who opts for self-
representation or litigation might also be the type of person 
who is inherently interested in syndi-court. These individuals 
may also be more contentious by nature and, therefore, seek 
out the types of television programs that are consistent with 
those tendencies, rather than the programming contributing 
toward the tendencies.268 
The little empirical evidence that exists, however, does not 
support a hypothesis that syndi-court viewers are any different 
from television viewers generally.269 Cultivation researchers 
have noted that most people who watch more of any particular 
type of program, such as syndi-court, "watch more types of pro-
grams" overall.270 Hence, frequent viewers of syndi-court are 
likely frequent viewers of television as a whole.271 Moreover, 
this paper does not argue that syndi-court is the sole explana-
tory factor in social litigiousness. Rather, it suggests that 
syndi-court plays a role in developing litigious attitudes in 
268 Data has also been collected from the Eligibles sample regarding the influence 
of gender, if any, on disputing behaviors, to wit: propensities toward litigation and pro 
se representation. This will be addressed in future publications. 
269 Friedman, supra note 109, at 555. 
Also, and unfortunately, neither study reported herein obtained data on respondent's 
television viewing as a whole. Thus, it cannot be determined whether frequent viewers 
are also frequent television viewers and! or whether non-viewers are also non-viewers 
of television. 
270 Gerbner et aI., supra note 120, at 45. 
271 Nevertheless, even as cultivation researchers debate genre effects, there is 
some agreement that a particular type of program may exert a heightened or "focused" 
effect on viewers. Id. 
44
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/2
2004] THE MONSTER IN THE TELEVISION 283 
some individuals and reinforces pre-existing attitudes III oth-
ers.272 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whether an individual is prone toward litigious action is a 
function of her perceptions of litigation and the social norms 
that support or encourage those perceptions. In contemporary 
society, these norms of legal behavior are brought to us com-
pliments of syndi-court. It tells us when to sue, under what cir-
cumstances to sue, and, in fact, implies that there are few in-
stances in which we wouldn't sue. Moreover, the results here 
suggest that the public is finally taking this message to heart, 
if not to the courtroom: data demonstrates that viewers of 
syndi-court are more inclined than non-viewers to consider dis-
puting and even representing themselves pro se. Although it is 
unlikely that business will forestall this brewing storm of liti-
giousness, a more accurate conception of litigious choice that 
reflects the propensities, motivation, and norms influencing 
consumer plaintiffs will allow business to base its litigation 
management strategies on fact rather than fiction. 
m See Podlas, supra note 152, at 14, 22. Furthermore, education level may pro-
vide an alternate explanation for the data. (prior experience with justice system did not 
appear to explain views about judicial behaviors and implications of judicial silence). 
Id. Some authors have positively correlated claims consciousness with education level, 
though others have suggested litigious individuals represent lower socio-economic 
status. Id. Sotirovic, supra note 108, at 9. Though education level per se was not ana-
lyzed here, the results of the Eligibles Study offer some indication of the potential 
impact of education on litigious attitudes. Unlike the Juror respondents whose educa-
tion level was unknown, but reasonably certain to include several individuals without 
college experience, respondents in the Eligibles group each had completed at least 1 
semester of college education. Therefore, when contemplating education as a potential 
explanatory factor, these respondents may be used for some degree of comparison. At 
least with regard to viewership and propensity toward pro se representation, frequent 
and non-viewer student respondents expressed views in line those of frequent and non-
viewer juror respondents, but they did so in higher proportions. In other words, it 
seemed that individuals with some college experience were more inclined to dispute or 
consider disputing. Other research has suggested a positive correlation between edu-
cation and! or experience with the legal system and propensity to dispute. See Richard 
E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary 
Culture, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 525, 551 0980-81). Additionally, the reason for the like-
lihood toward disputing has, itself, been disputed. Id. Some believe it represents power, 
others intelligence, and still other access. Id. See MacFarlane, supra note 4, at 686 
(access to legal system along with personal knowledge). 
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